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I.

INTRODUCTION

You see, but you do not observe. The distinction is clear.
- Sherlock Holmes 1
Twelve jurors stare at you. Your hands tremble. Breathing becomes
difficult. Cold sweat trickles down your forehead. As the prosecution questions
its star witness, a hushed silence ensnares the courtroom's gallery when that
witness points at you and says, "That's the person I saw do it."
Countless innocent defendants nationwide have experienced this
feeling; fortunately, West Virginia resident Roland Willis did not. Willis was
arrested in early 2013 after four eyewitnesses conclusively identified him as the
perpetrator in the stabbing of an 18-year-old man in Charleston, West

I

SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, A Scandal in Bohemia, in THE ADVENTURES OF SHERLOCK

HOLMES

1,2 (1892).
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2 Yet, as the investigation
Virginia.
continued, all four witnesses were proven
3
wrong.
Roland Willis's story is not an anomaly. Playing a role in nearly 72%
of cases later overturned through DNA, eyewitness misidentification "is the
single greatest cause of wrongful convictions nationwide.", 4 This revelation,
however, is not a recent discovery. Decades before the Innocence Project5
brought misidentification to the limelight, the United States Supreme Court, in
1967, recognized this glaring trend: "The vagaries of eyewitness identification
are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken
identifications." 6 This assertion holds true even today. In West Virginia alone,
DNA testing has exonerated five innocent people who served a combined 44
years in prison for crimes they did not commit: Gerald Davis, Dewey Davis,
William O'Dell Harris, Larry Holdem, and Glen Woodall.7 All had the same
contributing cause to their convictions-eyewitness misidentification.8
Despite its perceived unreliability, eyewitness evidence maintains a
powerful aura over jurors. Prominent eyewitness scholar Dr. Elizabeth F.
Loftus 9 states, "[E]yewitness testimony is likely to be believed by jurors,
especially when it is offered with a high level of confidence, even though the

accuracy of an eyewitness and the confidence of that witness may not be

2

Ashley B. Craig, Police Drop Charges Against Man in Club Impulse Shooting,

CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Jan. 31, 2013, http://www.charlestondailymail.com/News/Kanawha/

201301310246 (using a photo lineup, all four eyewitnesses identified Willis "without
hesitation").
3
Id.
4
Eyewitness Misidentification, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
understand/Eyewitness-Misidentification.php (last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
5
Founded by Barry C. Scheck and Peter J. Neufeld in 1992, the Innocence Project's mission
is to exonerate the wrongfully convicted utilizing DNA testing. About the Organization,
INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/ContenvWhat is_the_InnocenceProject
How did-itget-started.php (last visited Sept. 23, 2014). As of March 2, 2014, 312 people have
been exonerated. Id. Its website provides continual updates to the number of people exonerated.
Id.
6
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).
7
Search the Profiles, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.orgknow/SearchProfiles.phpcheck=check&title=&yearConviction=&yearExoneration=&jurisdiction=WV&caus
e=Eyewitness+Misidentification&perpetrator=&compensation=&conviction=&x=7&y- 1 (last
visited Sept. 23, 2014). While it cannot make up for their lost years, all five thankfully have been
financially compensated by the state for their wrongful incarceration. Id.
8
Id.
9
Specializing in cognitive psychology, human memory, and psychology and law, Dr. Loftus
is the Distinguished Professor of Social Ecology, and Professor of Law, and Cognitive Science at
the University of California Irvine. Elizabeth F. Loftus, UCI SOCIAL ECOLOGY,
http://socialecology.uci.edu/faculty/eloftus (last visited Sept. 23, 2014).
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related to one another at all.""' Two key attributes of eyewitness evidence are
its unreliability and its profound effect on juries." These alone reflect why
change is needed.
To assess the reliability of eyewitness evidence, the majority of courts
today use the test created in Manson v. Brathwaite.12 Since 1977, when Manson
was decided, over 2,000 scientific research studies have been conducted on
eyewitnesses.' 3 Still, the Manson test has not incorporated these findings; most
courts apply the test exactly as formulated in 1977.
This continued adherence to outdated beliefs is unacceptable.
Eyewitness research, primarily focusing on two distinct concepts-labeled
system variables and estimator variables-has revealed that eyewitnesses are
not as reliable as once believed to be. System variables are aspects "under the
direct control of the criminal justice system," whereas estimator variables are
"manipulable in research, [but] they cannot be controlled in actual criminal
cases. "4 Despite the conceptual differences between them, both variable types
have been shown to negatively impact eyewitnesses' accuracy. 15
Prompted by the wealth of available data, a few states recently have
rejected the Manson test and instead created their own standard to judge
eyewitness evidence.' 6 Other states-including West Virginia-need to follow
suit. Thus, this Note argues that West Virginia should formulate a new standard
incorporating what research has explicitly revealed: eyewitnesses are not
reliable. This new standard would reduce wrongful convictions based on faulty
eyewitnesses in two ways: (1) more available means for defendants to
challenge the reliability of identification evidence in pretrial hearings, and (2)
revising jury instructions to educate jurors about the limits of identification
evidence.
Implementing such a drastic change in West Virginia's legal system
first requires understanding the development of jurisprudence regarding
eyewitness identification. Part II of this Note, therefore, chronicles how the
Supreme Court's analysis on identification evidence has evolved from a per se
exclusionary rule to a totality of the circumstances test. Next, Part III discusses

10

Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352 (1981)

(Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting

F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 19 (1979)).
Id. at 350-55.
432 U.S. 98 (1977); see infra Part II.C.
See Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 738 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Gary L. Wells, Applied Eyewitness-Testimony Research: System Variables and Estimator

ELIZABETH
"
12
13

14

Variables, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1546, 1548 (1978). Examples of system variables
include lineup instructions, double-blind lineup administrations, and facial composites; examples
of estimator variables include stress, presence of a weapon, race, and amount of light present. See
infra Part IV.B-C.
15
See infra Part IV.B-C.
16
See infra Part III.B. 1-3.
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how eyewitness evidence is challenged in the courts by articulating the tests
used in West Virginia and those recently created in New Jersey, Oregon, and
Massachusetts. Part IV discusses the factors which prompted those three states
to reject the Manson test-the scientific data on how human memory functions,
system variables, and estimator variables. Finally, Part V concludes by
articulating three reasons why West Virginia should reject the Manson test and
outlining the proposed standard that the West Virginia courts should adopt
instead.
II.

THE SUPREME COURT'S JOURNEY ON EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE

The cornerstone of eyewitness identification jurisprudence begins with
three Supreme Court cases called the "Wade Trilogy." Following these seminal
cases, the Supreme Court has been inconsistent on deciding how defendants
can challenge identification evidence. Part II.A therefore explains the initial
constitutional protections created by the "Wade Trilogy" decisions before Part
II.B describes how subsequent cases have rendered these protections
completely obsolete. Part I.C then concludes with the current Supreme Court
endorsed standard.
A.

Implementing ConstitutionalProtection:The 'Wade Trilogy"

On June 12, 1967, the Supreme Court decided three cases establishing,
for the first time, constitutional boundaries on eyewitness identification: United
States v. Wade; 17 Gilbert v. California;8 and Stovall v. Denno' 9 (known
collectively as the "Wade Trilogy").
Recognizing that "identification evidence is peculiarly riddled with
innumerable dangers," the Supreme Court in Wade mandated that counsel be
present at all pretrial identification lineups.2 ° Classifying pretrial lineups as a
"critical" stage due to potential prejudice, the Court determined that having
counsel present would "operate[] to assure that the accused's interests w[ould]
2
be protected consistently with our adversary theory of criminal prosecution.", '
Although in Wade the defendant's lineup was conducted without counsel
present, the Court remanded the case to allow the State the opportunity to show

17
18

19
20
21

388 U.S. 218 (1967).
388 U.S. 263 (1967).
388 U.S. 293 (1967).
Wade, 388 U.S. at 228, 237.
Id. at 227, 236.
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that the in-court identification was based on other observations of the suspectan "independent source"-rather than the illegal lineup.22
In Gilbert, the defendant's lineup was likewise conducted without
counsel present, but unlike in Wade, the tainted identification was admitted at
trial.23 Unlike Wade's holding, which allowed for the State to show that the
identification was based on some independent source, 24 the Court in Gilbert
ruled that the State was prohibited from doing so because the jury had been
exposed to the tainted identification evidence.2 The Court reasoned that "only
a per se exclusionary rule ... can be an effective sanction to assure that law
constitutional right to the
enforcement authorities will respect the accused's
26
presence of his counsel at the critical lineup.',
In the final companion case, the Court in Stovall recognized
defendants' due process rights by holding that identification procedures
"unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification"
deny due process. 27 To determine what "unnecessarily suggestive" means,
courts were required to examine the "totality of the circumstances. 2 8 However,
the Court added that the totality of the circumstances standard could be relaxed
depending on the facts of each case. 29 Unlike the Wade and Gilbert decisions,
here a defendant's due process rights applied to all identification procedures
whether or not formal charges had been filed.3 °
Overall, the "Wade Trilogy" established three main protections for
defendants:
(1) They required the presence of counsel at all pretrial lineups
and showups taking place after June 12, 1967; (2) [e]ven if
counsel is present, the identification procedure may not be so

22

Id. at 220, 240-42 ("We do not think this disposition can be justified without first giving

the Government the opportunity to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court
identifications were based upon observations of the suspect other than the lineup identification.").
23
Gilbert,388 U.S. at 269, 272-73. In Gilbert,testimony of nine eyewitnesses who identified
Gilbert from the illegal lineup was admitted both at the trial and at the sentencing hearing. Id. at
272.
24
Wade, 338 U.S. at 242.
25
Gilbert,388 U.S. at 272-73.
Id. at 273 ("[T]he desirability of deterring the constitutionally objectionable practice must
26
prevail over the undesirability of excluding relevant evidence.").
27
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-02.
28
Id. at 302.
29
Id. In Stovall, the police brought the defendant to the witness's hospital room--without
counsel present-for an identification. Id. at 295. Because the police did not know how much
longer the witness would live and because there were no other witnesses to the crime, the Court
held there was no due process violation based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 302.
See Charles A. Pulaski, Neil v. Biggers: The Supreme Court Dismantles the Wade
30
Trilogy's Due Process Protection, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1097, 1103 (1974).
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unnecessarily suggestive as to be conducive to a mistaken
identification. Otherwise, there is a violation of due process;
and (3) [i]f these safeguards are violated, various sanctions will
be imposed. 3'
Unfortunately, these constitutional protections did not withstand the
passage of time. As discussed below, the Supreme Court quickly began
weakening, and later completely removing, these protections.
B. Dismantlingthe "Trilogy ": The Emphasis on Reliability
Does Wade's holding of right to counsel apply to identification
procedures occurring before the indictment? 32 Four short years after the "Wade
Trilogy" decisions, the Supreme Court addressed this issue in Kirby v.
Illinois.33 Before the defendant in Kirby was indicted for robbery, the victim
identified the defendant as the perpetrator. 34 Although counsel was not present
and the defendant was not advised of his Sixth Amendment right, the Supreme
Court decided that the right to counsel does not apply to pre-indictment
procedures. 35 Reasoning that counsel is only required after "the initiation of
adversary judicial criminal proceedings," the Court held that identification
procedures fall outside this stage.3 6
Consequently, a portion of the "Wade Trilogy" rules falls into disuse
because law enforcement can now delay formal proceedings until after
conducting such identification procedures. The due process protections from
Stovall became, at least for the time being, the foremost protection for
defendants from suggestive identification procedures.3 8
Nine months after Stovall, the Supreme Court heard due process
arguments on police usino photographs for identification purposes. 39 In
Simmons v. United States, the defendant claimed the photographic array

31

ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 184 (1979);

see also United States v.

Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228, 237 (1967); Stovall, 388 U.S. at 301-02.
32
See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 684 (1972).
33

406 U.S. 682 (1972).
Id. at 684-85.
35
Id. at 685, 690; see also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932).
36
Kirby, 406 U.S. at 688-89 (triggering Sixth Amendment right to counsel includes a
"formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment").
37
See LOFTUS, supra note 31, at 185.
38
See Pulaski, supra note 30, at 1103.
39
See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 381, 383 (1968).
40
390 U.S. 377 (1968).
34
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violated his due process rights. While acknowledging the "hazards of initial
identification by photograph[s]," the Supreme Court otherwise noted that police
commonly use this procedure and that cross-examination at trial would lessen
the likelihood of misidentification.4 2 The Court held that identification
evidence would be excluded only if "the photographic identification procedure
was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood
of irreparable misidentification. 43
Although the standards set forth in Stovall and Simmons may, at first
glance, look similar, they both suggest a different inquiry. 44 Stovall focused on
whether the identification procedure was "suggestive" and "unnecessary";
Simmons, on the other hand, focused on proof of an "irreparable
misidentification. 4 5 Simmons required a defendant to prove "irreparable
misidentification," whereas no burden was placed on the defendant in Stovall
because the Court then did not inquire whether the identification was actually
correct or not.46 While Stovall was seen as the more restrictive interpretation of
the two, 47 the Supreme Court would not resolve these differences until 1972 in
Neil v. Biggers.48
Biggers fundamentally changed how courts determined if a defendant's
due process rights were violated. 49 Biggers held that unnecessarily suggestive
identification procedures would not automatically result in excluding the
identification evidence. 50 Despite the suggestive procedure, courts still had to
view the totality of the circumstances to assess the potential for
misidentification. 5 1 The Court then laid out five factors (known as the "Biggers
factors") to test the identification evidence's reliability:

Id. at 383. One day after the bank robbery, FBI agents showed eyewitnesses group photos
containing both Simmons and his co-defendant; these pictures were obtained from the codefendant's sister. Id. at 380-81.
42
Id. at 384.
43
Id. Affirming Simmons's conviction, the Court reasoned that because the robbery took
place in the afternoon, the perpetrators wore no masks, and the identification was made only one
day later, there was no evidence of irreparable misidentification. Id.
44
See Pulaski, supra note 30, at 1108-09.
41

45

Id. at 1107-09.

46

Id.
Id. at 1113-14.

47

409 U.S. 188 (1972).
49
See Jack P. Lipton, Legal Aspects of Eyewitness Testimony, in PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES IN
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 7, 11 (Siegfried L. Sporoer et al. eds., 1996) (commenting on how
"drastic" the change was).
50
Biggers,409 U.S. at 199.
48

51

Id.
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(1) [O]pportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the
time of the crime, (2) the witness' degree of attention, (3) the
accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal, (4)
the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at
confrontation, and (5) the length of time between the crime and
the confrontation.5 2
The Biggers decision thus set the stage for Manson v. Brathwaite53 and
Perry v. New Hampshire,54 in which the Supreme Court set forth the current
standard for challenging eyewitness identification evidence.
C. Manson & Perry: The Majority StandardToday
After the Biggers decision, appellate courts seemingly developed two
approaches to identification evidence: a per se approach and a totality of the
circumstances approach. 55 The per se approach "focuse[d] on the procedures
employed and require[d] exclusion of the out-of-court identification
evidence.., whenever it has been obtained through unnecessarily suggested
confrontation procedures. 56 The totality of the circumstances approach, on the
other hand, admitted tainted identification evidence as long as the
"identification possesse[d] certain features of reliability" after comparing it
57
against the Biggers factors.
To set a uniform interpretation, the Supreme Court in Manson
famously declared, "[R]eliability is the linchpin in determining the
admissibility of identification testimony." 58 To challenge identification
evidence's reliability, Manson established a two-step test: (1) the court must
first decide whether the evidence was obtained through unnecessarily
suggestive means; and, if so, (2) the court must determine if the suggestive
procedures render the identification unreliable by examining the five Biggers
factors.59
52

Id. at 199-200.

53

432 U.S. 98 (1977).
54
132 S. Ct. 716 (2012).
55
Manson, 432 U.S. at 110.
56
Id. (noting that the rationale behind the per se approach was the "elimination of evidence of
uncertain reliability, deterrence of the police and prosecutors, and the stated 'fair assurance
against awful risks of misidentification"').
57
Id. Recognized as more lenient, the totality of the circumstances standard "serves to limit
the societal costs imposed by a sanction that excludes relevant evidence from consideration and
evaluation by the trier of fact." Id.
58
Id. at 114.
59
See Robert Couch, A Model for Fixing Identification Evidence After Perry v. New
Hampshire, 111 MIcH. L. REv. 1535, 1537 (2013); see also Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct.
716, 724 (2012).
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The Court listed three reasons for rejecting the per se approach. 60 First,
the Court believed that the jury should hear all reliable, even if somewhat
tainted, identification evidence because "[j]uries are not so susceptible that they
cannot measure intelligently the weight of identification testimony that has
some questionable feature. 61 Second, the Court reasoned that the totality2
approach would deter police from using unnecessarily suggestive procedures.
Third, the Court opined that the totality approach would further justice because
the per se approach would deny the jury key evidence thereby increasing the
probability of the guilty going free.63
After Manson, an eyewitness evidence case would not make it to the
Supreme Court again for the next 30 years. In 2012, the Court reviewed Perry
v. New Hampshire64 to address whether a defendant's due process rights are
violated by suggestive identification circumstances not arranged by the
police.6 5 The Court held that "[t]he fallibility of eyewitness evidence does not,
without the taint of improper state conduct, warrant66a due process rule requiring
a trial court to screen such evidence for reliability.
Although briefly acknowledging the significant development in
67
as discussed by Justice Sonia M.
scientific research on eyewitnesses,
68
determined that constitutional
Court
the
dissent,
lone
in
the
Sotomayor
jury instructions,
cross-examination,
including
safeguards during trial,
evidentiary rules, and expert testimony, would adequately protect defendants
from questionable eyewitness evidence. 69 The Manson test was thereby left
unchanged.

60
61
62
63

Manson, 432 U.S. at 111-13 (labeling an exclusionary rule as a "[d]raconian sanction").
Id. at 112, 116.
Id. at 112.
Id. at 112-13.

132 S. Ct. 716 (2012).
Id. at 723. A police officer questioned Perry in an apartment parking lot after he was found
near several vandalized cars. Id. at 721. As Perry and the officer were talking outside, another
officer arrived and asked an eyewitness in her apartment to describe the suspect; the witness then
looked out her kitchen window and identified Perry. Id. at 722. One month later, the witness was
shown a photographic array containing Perry's picture: the witness failed to identify Perry from
it. Id. After being convicted, Perry argued that the nighttime identification violated due process
because it was essentially a one-person lineup guaranteeing that the eyewitness would only pick
him. Id.
Id. at 728.
66
Id. (noting the amicus brief submitted by the American Psychological Association).
67
Id. at 738-39 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (over 2,000 studies on eyewitness identification
68
64

65

has been conducted over the past three decades). Justice Sotomayor chastised the majority for
adopting an "artificially narrow conception of the dangers of suggestive identifications .... Id.
at 739.
69
Id. at 728-29 (acknowledging that the jury still convicted Perry even after being made

aware of the identification's weaknesses through cross examination and closing arguments).
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III.DIFFERENT APPROACHES To CHALLENGE EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE IN
COURT TODAY

While the Supreme Court-and West Virginia-remains committed to
the Manson test, some states have become aware of its flaws. Part III.A
describes the current method West Virginia courts employ today to judge
eyewitness evidence. Part III.B then details how certain states have abandoned
the Supreme Court's analysis and instead drafted their own approach on how to
assess identification evidence's reliability.
A.

Eyewitness Evidence in West Virginia Courts

Echoing the Supreme Court, West Virginia courts have declared the
overall "concern is on the reliability of the [eyewitness identification]
testimony., 70 Thus, West Virginia officially adopted the totality of the
circumstances standard in determining whether to suppress in-court
identifications based on suggestive out-of-court procedures.' This standard
was later clarified to include whether the out-of-court identification itself
should be suppressed. 72 Therefore, the current standard in West Virginia is the
Manson test:
In determining whether an out-of-court identification of a
defendant is so tainted as to require suppression of an in-court
identification [or testimony as to the out-of-court identification
itself] a court must look to the totality of the circumstances and
determine whether the identification was reliable, even though
the confrontation procedure was suggestive, with due regard
given to such factors as [the five Biggers factors].73
Although West Virginia still utilizes Manson, it has, unlike most states,
begun to recognize eyewitness misidentification as an increasing problem. To
remedy this, West Virginia enacted new legislation, titled the Eyewitness
Identification Act, 74 to prevent misidentifications from occurring. 75

State v. Boykins, 320 S.E.2d 134, 137 (W. Va. 1984).
See, e.g., State v. Casdorph, 230 S.E.2d 476, 481 (W. Va. 1976).
72
See State v. Spence, 388 S.E.2d 498, 503-04 (W. Va. 1989); State v. Boyd, 280 S.E.2d
669, 678 (W. Va. 1981) (clarifying that the Biggers test should also apply in determining whether
the out-of-court identification itself should be suppressed).
73 E.g., Spence, 388 S.E.2d at 503-04.
70

71

W. VA. CODE §§ 62-1E-1 to -3 (2014).
75 See Lawrence Messina, Bill Targets Witness Errors Senate Proposal Would Help Prevent
Misidentification, CHARLESTON GAZETTE & DAiLY MAIL, Feb. 23, 2007, 2007 WLNR 3583924
74

("Eyewitness misidentification is a serious problem, and the reforms being considered in West
Virginia are proven to increase the accuracy of identifications.").
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The West Virginia Eyewitness Identification Act was passed in 2007
and was recently amended in 2013. This statute requires all West Virginia law
enforcement agencies that conduct eyewitness identification procedures to
S 76 live lineups,
create "specific written procedures for conducting photo lineups,
and showups" that comply with the statute's recommendations. For example,
76

W. VA. CODE § 62-1E-3. Section 62-1E-2 of the West Virginia Eyewitness Identification

Act completely lists the recommendations:
(a) Prior to a lineup or showup, law enforcement should record as complete a
description as possible of the perpetrator provided by the eyewitness, in the
eyewitness's own words. This statement should also include information
regarding the conditions under which the eyewitness observed the perpetrator
including location, time, distance, obstructions, lighting and weather
conditions. The eyewitness should also be asked if he or she wears or has
been prescribed glasses or contact lenses and whether he or she was wearing
them at the time of the witnessed event. The administrator should record
whether or not the eyewitness was wearing glasses or contact lenses at the
time of the lineup or showup.
(b) After completing the requirements of subsection (a) of this section, but
before a lineup or showup, the eyewitness should be given the following
instructions:
(1) That the perpetrator may or may not be present in the lineup, or, in the
case of a showup, may or may not be the person that is presented to the
eyewitness;
(2) That the eyewitness is not required to make an identification;
(3) That it is as important to exclude innocent persons as it is to identify the
perpetrator;
(4) That the investigation will continue whether or not an identification is
made; and
(5) That the administrator does not know the identity of the perpetrator.
(c) Nothing should be said, shown or otherwise suggested to the eyewitness
that might influence the eyewitness's identification of any particular lineup
or showup member, at any time prior to, during or following a lineup or
showup.
(d) All lineups should be conducted blind unless to do so would place an
undue burden on law enforcement or the investigation. If conducting a blind
lineup would place an undue burden on law enforcement or the investigation,
then the administrator shall use the folder shuffle method.
(e) All lineups should be conducted in a sequential presentation. When there
are multiple suspects, each identification procedure shall include only one
suspect.
(f) At least four fillers should be used in all lineups. The fillers shall resemble
the description of the suspect as much as practicable and shall not unduly
stand out.
(g) In a photo lineup, there should be no characteristics of the photos
themselves or the background context in which they are placed which shall
make any of the photos unduly stand out.
(h) In a live lineup, all lineup participants must be out of view of the
eyewitness prior to the identification procedure.
(i) If there are multiple eyewitnesses for the same lineup:
(1) Each eyewitness should view the lineup or lineups separately;
(2) The suspect should be placed in a different position in the lineup for each
eyewitness; and
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one recommendation is that police should only give the following instructions
to an eyewitness before conducting a live lineup:
(1) That the perpetrator may or may not be present in the
lineup, or, in the case of a showup, may or may not be the
person that is presented to the eyewitness; (2) That the
eyewitness is not required to make an identification; (3) That it
is as important to exclude innocent persons as it is to identify
the perpetrator; (4) That the investigation will continue
whether or not an identification is made; and (5) That the
administrator does not know the identity of the perpetrator.77
While the statute's opponents argued, in 2007 when the act was first
passed, that it "t[ies] the hands of law enforcement,, 78 the statute's detailed
recommendations-ranging from how to conduct a lineup to how many people

(3) The eyewitnesses should not be permitted to communicate with each
other until all identification procedures have been completed.
0) Showups should only be performed using a live suspect and only in
exigent circumstances that require the immediate display of a suspect to an
eyewitness. A law-enforcement official shall not conduct a showup with a
single photo; rather a photo lineup must be used.
(k) Law-enforcement officers should make a written or video record of a
lineup which shall be provided to the prosecuting attorney in the event that
any person is charged with the offense under investigation. The written
record shall include all steps taken to comply with this article which shall
include the following information:
(1) The date, time and location of the lineup;
(2) The names of every person in the lineup, if known, and all other persons
present at the lineup;
(3) The words used by the eyewitness in any identification, including words
that describe the eyewitness's certainty or uncertainty in the identification at
the time the identification is made;
(4) Whether it was a photo lineup or live lineup;
(5) The number of photos or individuals that were presented in the lineup;
(6) Whether the lineup administrator knew which person in the lineup was
the suspect;
(7) Whether, before the lineup, the eyewitness was instructed that the
perpetrator might or might not be presented in the lineup;
(8) Whether the lineup was simultaneous or sequential;
(9) The signature, or initials, of the eyewitness, or notation if the eyewitness
declines or is unable to sign; and
(10) A video of the lineup and the eyewitness's response may be included.
W. VA. CODE § 62-1E-2.
77
W. VA. CODE §§ 62-1E-2(b)(1)-(5).
78 Messina, supra note 75. State Senator Evan Jenkins
stated "this legislation is tying the
hands of law enforcement in a fluid environment .... We really need to address crime in this
state, and this is a step in the wrong direction." Id.
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79
must be included-aim to reduce the possibility of incorrect identifications.
This statute recognizes that the police can have a powerful impact on
eyewitnesses. 80 Yet, it only deals with collecting eyewitness evidence on the
ground level; admitting and challenging this evidence in the court system,
however, is an entirely different matter.8 1

B. Leading the Reform Movement: New Jersey, Oregon, and
Massachusetts
Thirty-seven years have passed since the Supreme Court announced the
Manson test. During this time, Manson remained the status quo. However, in
2011, New Jersey issued State v. Henderson.82 Oregon soon followed a year
838
later with State v. Lawson. Massachusetts continued the trend in 2013.84
Change had officially begun.
1. Due Process Upheaval: New Jersey's Answer
Acknowledging that a "vast body of scientific research about human
Jersey in State v. Henderson
memory has emerged," the Supreme Court of New
85
revision.
needed
test
Manson
the
that
declared
Stemming from a murder investigation where the defendant was
identified through a photo array, the court formulated a new framework for
challenging eyewitness evidence: (1) the defendant must present evidence of
"suggestiveness" to obtain a pretrial hearing; (2) the State then must establish
that the identification is reliable, accounting for both estimator and system
variables; (3) the defendant still has the overall burden to show a "substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification" through either cross-examining
eyewitnesses, presenting expert testimony, or by introducing evidence linked
with both types of variables; and (4) the court should suppress the identification
if it determines, after weighing the evidence, that the defendant demonstrated
79
80

81

See supra note 76 for a complete list.
See infra Part IV.B.
See supraParts II.A-C, III.A.

27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011). In Henderson, the court appointed a Special Master to evaluate
the current scientific evidence on eyewitnesses. Id. at 877. After interviewing seven experts, the
Special Master presented the court 2,000 transcript pages and reports on hundreds of scientific
studies. Id. The court adopted much of what the Special Master reported. Id.
83 291 P.3d 673 (Or. 2012).
82

84

COMMONWEALTH OF MASS.,

SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT STUDY GROUP ON EYEWITNESS

EVIDENCE (July 25, 2013), available at http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/sjc/docs/eyewitnessevidence-report-2013.pdf.
85 See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 877-78, 918-20 ("In the end, we conclude that the current
standard for assessing eyewitness identification evidence does not fully meet its goals. It does not
offer an adequate measure for reliability or sufficiently deter inappropriate police conduct.").
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an irreparable misidentification.8 6 Yet, if the court admits the identification then
the trial will proceed as normal; at the conclusion, however, the court will
charge the jury with specially tailored jury instructions.87
To obtain a pretrial hearing, "suggestive" evidence must exist; this
pertains exclusively to system variables. 88 The court determined that estimator
variables alone should not trigger a pretrial hearing because courts have no
control over these variables; the number of pretrial hearings would increase
astronomically; and the judge's interpretation of each variable's potential effect
on the witness would play too large a role.89 Once evidence is presented,
however, then the court can examine both system and estimator variables
together. 90 The court believed that encompassing both types would "address
reliability with greater care and better reflect how memory works." 9 1 If the
defendant's allegation is shown
to be groundless, the court can automatically
92
end the hearing at any time.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey in Henderson broadened a
defendant's due process protection against faulty eyewitness evidence in two
ways: it (1) increased procedural scrutiny and (2) completely rewrote jury
instructions for cases using eyewitness evidence.9 3 By not adopting a per se
exclusionary rule, the Henderson test provides less of an incentive for
prosecutors to cover up mistakes of law enforcement.94 Simultaneously, police

86 Id. at 879-82, 920. See supra note 14 and accompanying text for the definitions on system
and estimator variables. For a list of system and estimator variables, see infra Part IV.B-C.
87
Id. at 924-26.
88
Id. at 920. System variables are actions under the criminal justice system's control, such as

how to conduct a lineup or showup. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. For a more
detailed list of system variables, see infra Part IV.B.
89
Id. at 923. The court believed focusing exclusively on estimator variables alone would be
too much of a judgment call for judges: "it is difficult to image that a trial judge would preclude a
witness from testifying because the lighting was 'too dark,' ......
How dark is too dark as a matter
of law? ...What guideposts would a trial judge use in making those judgment calls?" Id. In
addition, the court was worried about overburdening the judicial system with an increase in
pretrial hearings. Id. The court noted that in 2009 it conducted 200 Wade hearings; that number
would increase if a defendant could motion for a hearing based on estimator variables alone,
which could possibly exist in every eyewitness case. Id. For a list of estimator variables, see infra
Part IV.C.
90
Id. at 922. One of the principal goals behind the revised framework was to "allow all
relevant system and estimator variables to be explored and weighed at pretrial hearings when
there is some actual evidence of suggestiveness." Id. at 919.
91
Id. at 922.
92
Id. at 920.
93 See id. at 919; see also Amy D. Trenary, Note, State v. Henderson: A Modelfor Admitting
Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 84 U. COLO. L. REv. 1257, 1296 (2013).
94
See Jacob L. Zerkle, Note, I Never Forget a Face: New Jersey Sets the Standard in
Eyewitness IdentificationReform, 47 VAL. U. L. REv. 357,388 (2012).
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procedures should become more efficient as judges can now further investigate
95
identification procedures during a defendant's pretrial hearing. In addition,
modem scientific data on eyewitnesses is incorporated because the judge can
examine more variables. 9 6 Finally, by requiring the judge to inform the jury
jurors become more aware of
about such variables through jury instructions,
97
evidence.
identification
such problems in
2. The Rules of Evidence: The Oregon Approach
Unlike New Jersey's focus on due process, Oregon decided in State v.
Lawson to strictly use the rules of evidence to address the growing problem of
eyewitness misidentification. 99 In Lawson, the court created a three step
approach to eyewitness evidence: (1) when a defendant files a motion to
exclude the identification, the State, as the proponent, has the initial burden to
establish its relevancy; (2) if the State satisfies step one, the defendant must
then establish that the evidence's probative value is "substantially outweighed"
by certain factors such as unfair prejudice; and (3) if the court concludes that
exclude the identification or impose
the defendant has met this standard, it can 100
exclusion.
of
short
remedy
intermediate
an
In Lawson, the court decided to focus solely on evidentiary procedures,
believing that nothing plausible existed "to hinder the analysis of eyewitness
reliability with purposeless distinctions between suggestiveness and other
sources of unreliability."' ' The Lawson court reasoned that evidentiary rules,
not due process, are the preferred way to challenge an identification because
"[a] trial court tasked with determining a constitutional claim must necessarily
assume that the evidence is otherwise admissible; were it inadmissible on
evidentiary grounds, the court would never reach the constitutional
98

95
See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 923 ("More probing pretrial hearings about suggestive police
procedures, though, can deter inappropriate police practices."); see also Zerkle, supra note 94, at
388.
96
See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 922; see also Zerkle, supra note 94, at 389.
97
See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 924-25 ("[Ilt is the court's obligation to help jurors evaluate
evidence critically and objectively to ensure a fair trial."); see also Zerkle, supra note 94, at 390.
291 P.3d 673 (Or. 2012).
98

Id. at 690-91 (concluding that the Oregon Evidence Code is the proper way to determine
admissibility of eyewitness evidence because the rules "articulate minimum standards of
reliability intended to apply broadly to many types of evidence").
100 Id. at 697; see OR. EVID. CODE 104 (Preliminary Questions), 307 (Allocation of the Burden
of Producing Evidence), 602 (Lack of Personal Knowledge), 701 (Opinion Testimony by Lay
Witnesses), 402 (Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible), and 403 (Exclusion of Relevant
Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion or Undue Delay).
101 Lawson, 291 P.3d at 688-89.
99
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question." 10 2 The court declared that requiring the defendant to establish
evidence of a suggestive identification procedure first-like the due process
structure mandates-is improper because the State administers and controls the
evidence. 103
Although focusing on a different legal area, Oregon went one step
further than New Jersey in some aspects. In Oregon, courts now must consider
all factors that may affect an eyewitness's reliability at once. 104 In addition, like
in New Jersey, it allows judges to impose intermediate remedies such as
permitting expert testimony or limiting the witness's testimony. 105 Finally, the
State has the initial burden-not the defendant (like in Henderson)-to
establish the admissibility of the identification evidence. 106
3. The Study Group: Massachusetts's Recommendations
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court created the "Study Group
on Eyewitness Identification" (Study Group) to deter suggestive identification
procedures and reduce the risk of wrongful convictions. 07 The Study Group
concluded that new scientific research rendered Massachusetts's law
inadequate, and thus proposed a new legal framework to deter suggestive
identification procedures. 108
Because Henderson and Lawson offered conflicting dichotomies,
Massachusetts declined to base its proposal on either respective approach. 10 9
Henderson was believed to be "over-inclusive" with the potential to burden
judicial resources and slow the resolution of criminal matters.' l" Regarding
Lawson, placing the initial burden on the prosecution conflicted with current

102

Id. at 689 ("[A] trial court tasked with considering a question of evidentiary admissibility

clearly cannot begin by assuming admissibility.").
103

id.

104 See id. at 694-95 (OR. EVID. CODE 403 encompasses both system and estimator variables).
But see State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 920 (N.J. 2011) (only evidence of system variables will
result in a pretrial hearing).
105 See Lawson, 291 P.3d at 695; see also Henderson, 27 A.3d at 925 (judges under the
Henderson test can also limit parts of identification testimony).
106
See Lawson, 291 P.3d at 697. Contra Henderson, 27 A.3d at 920 (the defendant must first
present evidence of suggestiveness to earn a hearing).
107
COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., supra note 84, at 1 (the group consisted of prosecutors, judges,
defense attorneys, law enforcement, and academic scholars).
108 Id. at41.
'09
Id. at 46-47.
110 Id. at 43; see supra note 89 and accompanying text (discussing New Jersey's concern on

overburdening the court system).
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Massachusetts due process standards; it was also believed that treating all
sources of reliability identically weakened defendants' due process rights.'
Accordingly, Massachusetts recommended four routes a defendant
could take to obtain a pretrial hearing on identification evidence:
(1) [T]he defendant makes a preliminary showing of an
unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure... ; or (2)
the defendant makes a showing that a witness was involved in
a highly suggestive confrontation with the defendant
independent of any police involvement... ; or (3) that the
police failed to follow certain specific [B]est [P]olice
[P]ractices on eyewitness identification in a substantial way in
conducting or arranging a pretrial identification procedure; or
(4) when the pretrial eyewitness identification is
uncorroborated and the defendant makes a showing of the
presence of estimator 2variables casting doubt on the reliability
of the identification. 1
By increasing the threshold to obtain a hearing, the Massachusetts
recommendations provide an incentive for the police to follow eyewitness
identification procedures, and it allows the court to account for estimator
variables by scrutinizing uncorroborated eyewitness evidence." 3 At the
hearing, both system and estimator variables will be examined. 114
Once granted a pretrial hearing, the identification evidence may be
excluded in three different ways." 5 First, the out-of-court identification will be
excluded if the defendant "proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the
out-of-court identification was so unnecessarily sugestive that it was
conducive to irreparable misidentification . . . . 6 For the in-court
identification to be admissible, the Commonwealth, by clear and convincing
evidence, must prove that it "is the product of a source independent of the
tainted procedure and is reliable."" 7
Second, both the in-court and out-of-court identification will be
excluded if the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence proves "the

"' Id. at 44-46. The Study Group believed that "treating all sources of reliability alike-both
police suggestiveness and estimator variable problems-runs the risk of weakening a defendant's
due process rights concerning police conduct." Id. at 46. See supra note 100 and accompanying
text for discussion of the State's initial burden under the Lawson test.
112 Id. at 47 (citation omitted).
113
Id. at 47-48.
Id. at 111.
115 Id. at 110-11.
114

116

117

Id. at 111; see also Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1967).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., supra note 84, at Ill (both identifications will be excluded if

the Commonwealth cannot prove so); see also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 240 (1967).
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pretrial eyewitness identification is unreliable, taking into account the totality
of the circumstances in the case at bar, including system and estimator
variables .... "18
Third, both the in-court and out-of-court identifications will be
excluded if the "defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the
police failed in a substantial way to follow certain specific Best Police
Practices . . . ."119 Nonetheless, if the case does proceed to trial, similar to
Henderson and Lawson, the Study Group recommended that the judge be able
to issue specific jury instructions, limit witness testimony, and permit
introduction of expert testimony at trial. 120
A caveat does exist however. Despite the thoroughness of the Study
Group's report, its findings are still only recommendations; no guarantee exists
that the Massachusetts judicial system will implement the changes.
What propelled New Jersey, Oregon, and Massachusetts to create these
new eyewitness standards? Undoubtedly, the sheer amount of scientific data
available detailing the unreliability of eyewitnesses propelled this change.
Although these three approaches to identification evidence vary, they all have
one thing in common: the overall belief that the Manson test is ineffective.
IV. THE SCIENCE PROMPTING STATES TO REJECT THE MANSON TEST

Jennifer Thompson was exhausted and frightened; yet, she was 100%
2
positive she found her rapist after identifying Ronald Cotton in a lineup.' 1
Eleven years later, Ronald Cotton was released from prison as DNA proved his
innocence.122 Why are eyewitnesses-even confident ones like Jennifer
Thompson-unreliable? Is it because they "must testify about an encounter
with a total stranger under circumstances of emergency or emotional stress," or
is it because "the witness' recollection of the stranger can be distorted easily by
the circumstances or by later actions of the police"? 123 This Part will show that
the answer is a combination of both.

118

119
120

supra note 84, at 111.
Id. (for a list of Massachusetts's Best Police Practices, see pages 85-90 of the report).
Id. at 112-13; see also State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 925 (2011); State v. Lawson, 291
COMMONWEALTH OF MASS.,

P.3d 673, 695-96 (2012).
121

What Jennifer Saw, FRONTLINE,

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/dna/

interviews/thompson.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2014).
122 Ronald Cotton, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/RonaldCotton.php (last visited Nov. 19, 2014).
123
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112 (1977).
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What the Brain Sees: How Memory Operates

Memory is malleable; it is not permanently etched in stone.' 2 4 Contrary
to popular belief, the brain does not work like a videotape recorder. 125 Instead,
reconstruction or
memory can be more aptly described as "an imaginative
126
fragments.
rudimentary
construction" of imprecise,
27
Memory is housed in the largest portion of the brain, the cerebrum,
which is divided into two hemispheres, each containing four lobes: frontal,
temporal, parietal, and occipital. 128 Memory is specifically stored within those
lobes. 129 The frontal lobe, the largest of the four, contains the prefrontal cortex,
which plays an important part in memory because it controls head and eye
movements. 30 Located in the back of the brain, the occipital lobe enables
visual information-colors and shapes-to be received and processed.' 3' The
parietal lobe gives meaning to objects from stored information as it receives
different signals from other parts of the body.' 32 On each side of the brain are
33
the temporal lobes, which help people recognize objects and human faces.
Working together, these four sections of the brain control how eyewitnesses
perceive an event.
Human recollection can be divided into three stages: (1) acquisition,
(2) retention, and (3) retrieval. 34 First, the witness perceives the incident-the
acquisition stage. 135 Second, the witness commits the information to memory
during the period of time between the event and its recall-the retention
stage. 136 Finally, the witness recalls the stored information-the retrieval

124

See ELIZABETH F.

LOFrUS ET AL., EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 14 (5th

ed.

2013); see also LOFTUS, supra note 31, at 21.
See LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 124, at 14.
125
126 Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association in Support of Petitioner at 7,
Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012) (No. 10-8974) (citing FREDERIC C. BARTLETT,
REMEMBERING:

A STUDY

IN EXPERIMENTAL

AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 213), available at

http://www.apa.org/about/offices/ogc/amicus/new-hampshire.pdf.
127

Anatomy

of the Brain, AM. ASSOC.

OF NEUROLOGICAL

SURGEONS

(June

2006),

http://www.aans.org/Patient%201nformation/Conditions%20and%2OTreatments/Anatomy%20of
%20the%2OBrain.aspx.
128

Id.; see also RITA CARTER ET AL., THE HUMAN BRAIN BOOK: AN ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO ITS

STRUCTURE, FUNCTION, AND DISORDERS 66-68 (2009).

129

Anatomy of the Brain, supra note 127.

130 id.
131 Id.
Id.
132
133

Id.

134

See LoFTUS ET AL., supra note 124, at 14.

135 Id.
136

Id.
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stage. 137 Numerous factors can distort a witness's accuracy during these
stages. 138
During the acquisition stage-also called encoding-variables that can
influence the information being stored are divided into either event or witness
factors. 3 9 Event factors are details within the event itself such as the duration
of the incident. 140 Witness factors, on the other hand, are factors exclusively
pertaining to the witness; this includes age or gender. 141 Because many of the
factors that can distort an eyewitness's memory during the acquisition stage are
beyond anyone's
control, these factors are also known as "estimator
142
variables."'

Following the acquisition stage, the witness commits the information to
memory during the retention stage. 143 Four major variables exist during this
stage that can potentially distort an eyewitness's memory: (1) length of
retention interval; (2) verbal form of the post-event information; (3) violence of
the event; and (4) whether any warning44is given that the post-event information
about to be received may be distorted. 1
Retrieving memory fragments can occur in many different ways. 45 A
witness may be asked a specific question or could be presented with an object
triggering the event's recollection. 146 The method or even the wording of the
question itself can affect how an eyewitness retrieves information. 14 ' Likely
occurring in court or a police station, many of the factors affecting retrieval
are
48
labeled "system variables" because exposure to them can be controlled.
It is therefore evident that many variables affect a witness's memory.
Accordingly, each is described in more detail below. Besides being the most

137

138

Id.
Id. at 15; see infra Part IV.B-C.

139 id.
140

Id.

141

143

Id.
Id.; see Wells, supranote 14, at 1548. See infra Part IV.C for a list of estimator variables.
See LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 124, at 14; see also Zerkle, supra note 94, at 369.

144

See LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 124, at 62.

145

Id. at 66.

146

Id.

147

Id. When it comes to the type of questions asked, witnesses that are allowed to talk freely

142

in the beginning and then answer specific questions towards the end produce the more accurate
recall. Id. For how to word questions, the questions that yielded the more accurate result
mentioned the actual event in them (leading questions). Id. at 66-67.
148 Id. at 16; see Wells, supra note 14, at 1548. See infra Part IV.B for a list of system
variables.
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studied, the following lists of variables are the same
ones that New Jersey,
49
1
Oregon, and Massachusetts specifically discussed.

B. Ability to Control: System Variables
System variables are variables that can be controlled by the criminal
justice system. 150 They are labeled as such because understanding them can
lead to change in how the criminal justice system operates."'5 Divided into two
broad categories, interviewing witnesses and identifying suspects, many social
influences exist that affect both.152 The system variables discussed here are (1)
double-blind administration, (2) lineup instructions, (3) lineup construction, (4)
feedback and confidence, (5) multiple viewings, (6) simultaneous versus
sequential lineups, (7) facial composites, and (8) showups.
1. Double-Blind Administration
The ideal lineup consists of an administrator who knows neither the
suspect's identity nor the suspect's position in the lineup.' 53 Known as a
double-blind procedure, its purpose is to "prevent an administrator from

intentionally or unintentionally influencing a witness'[s] identification
decision."'1 4 A lineup administrator can have a significant influence over the
witness, especially if the administrator knows the suspect's position, 5 5 because
an "experimenter's knowledge and beliefs about how participants should
respond are communicated, directly or indirectly, through the experimenter's
behavior"-this is called the expectancy effect.' 5 6 Thus, if the administrator
knows the identity of the suspect in the lineup, her words or subtle cues can

149 See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 896-909 (N.J. 2011); State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673,
686-88 (Or. 2012); COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., supra note 84, at 19-32.
See Wells, supra note 14, at 1548.
150
151 Id.
152

See Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Evidence: Improving Its Probative Value, 7 PSYCHOL.

SCI. INTHE PUB. INT. 45, 55 (2006) [hereinafter Eyewitness Evidence].
153 See id. at 63; see also Henderson, 27 A.3d at 897; LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 124, at 92-93.
154 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 896.
155
See Steven E. Clark et al., Lineup Administrator Influences on Eyewitness Identification
Decisions, 15 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 63, 63 (2009); see also Gary L. Wells et al.,
Eyewitness Identification Procedures:Recommendationsfor Lineups and Photospreads,22 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 603,627-29 (1998) [hereinafter, Recommendations].
Ryann M. Haw & Ronald P. Fisher, Effects of Administrator-Witness Contact on
156
Eyewitness Identification Accuracy, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1106, 1106 (2004); see also
Recommendations, supra note 155, at 627.
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lead the witness to choose that suspect. 157 Although most witnesses are
unaware of this influence, double-blind lineups should be used to eliminate this
potential bias and allow witnesses to make selections strictly from memory

alone. 158
2. Lineup Instructions
Before a lineup is conducted, two instructions can be given to a
witness: neutral or biased. 159 A neutral instruction states that the suspect may or
may not be present in the lineup and that the witness has the power to reject the
lineup if he concludes the suspect is absent. 160 But a biased instruction,
conversely, tells the witness that he should select someone
61 from the lineup; the
witness is not told that the suspect may not be present. 1
Manipulating witnesses into believing the suspect is actually present
relaxes their decision-making process thereby increasing the probability that a
witness will select someone. 16Biased instructions lead to higher identification
errors in target-absent lineups because the propensity to select a lineup member
63
is dramatically higher; yet it has no similar effect for target-present lineups. 1
Neutral instructions, on the other hand, "result[] in fewer choices and fewer
false identifications without a decrease in correct identifications."' 164 This
illustrates the power of lineup instructions
demonstrating why neutral
65
instructions should always be given. 1

157

See Haw & Fisher, supra note 156, at 1106-107; see also Eyewitness Evidence, supra note

152, at 630.
158
Haw & Fisher, supra note 156, at 1107; Recommendations, supra note 155, at 627.
159
Joanna D. Pozzulo & Julie Dempsey, Biased Lineup Instructions: Examining the Effect of
Pressure on Children's and Adults' Eyewitness Identification Accuracy, 36 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL.1381, 1383 (2006).
160
Id. at 1383.
161 Id.
162
Roy S. Malpass & Patricia G. Devine, Eyewitness Identification: Lineup Instructions and
the Absence of the Offender, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 482, 487 (1981) [hereinafter Eyewitness
Identification].
163
Id. at 486; see also LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 124, at 91; Roy S. Malpass & Patricia G.
Devine, Guided Memory in Eyewitness Identification, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 343, 346-47
(198 1); Nancy Steblay, Social Influence in Eyewitness Recall: A Meta-Analytic Review of Lineup
Instruction Effects, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 283, 294 (1997); Gary L. Wells & Deah S.
Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Proceduresand the Supreme Court's Reliability
Test in Light of Eyewitness Science: 30 Years Later, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1,6-7 (2009);
Eyewitness Evidence, supra note 152, at 60; Recommendations,supra note 155, at 629-30.
164
Eyewitness Identification, supra note 162, at 487; Recommendations, supra note 155, at
629-30.
165 LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 124, at 91.
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3. Lineup Construction
Kevin Spacey, Gabriel Byrne, Benicio Del Toro, Stephen Baldwin, and
Kevin Pollak walk into a room in a police station for a lineup: all have different
hairstyles; two have facial hair; all are wearing different outfits; all are different
the movie "THE USUAL SUSPECTS,"
heights. Despite being an iconic scene in 166
this is an incorrect way to conduct lineups.
Live lineups and photo arrays are the two main lineup types. 167 Unlike
the more familiar live lineup, a photo array has a witness look through a group
of photographs before making a selection. 168 There are several cardinal rules in
conducting lineups. To the Department of Justice, four of these rules are
essential however:
(1) Include only one suspect in each identification procedure[;]
(2) Select fillers who generally fit the witness' description of
the perpetrator. When there is a limited/inadequate description
of the perpetrator provided by the witness, or when the
description of the perpetrator differs significantly from the
appearance of the suspect, fillers should resemble the suspect
in significant features[;] ... [(3)] Include a minimum of four
[for photo arrays or five for live lineups] fillers (non-suspects)
per identification procedure[;] and [(4)] Create a consistent
appearance between the suspect and fillers with respect to any
unique or unusual feature (e.g., scars, tattoos) used to describe
the perpetrator by artificially adding or concealing that
feature. 69
Under the Department of Justice's recommendations, the overall goal is
creating a fair lineup in which the suspect does not stand out, thereby allowing
the witness to make an accurate identification. 170 Following these simple, basic
rules allows this to happen.

166

THE USUAL SUSPECTS (MGM Studios 1995).

167

LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 124, at 87-88.

168

Id. at 88.

169

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 29-31

(1999), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/178240.pdf; see also Roy S. Malpass et
al., Lineup Construction and Lineup Fairness, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS
PSYCHOLOGY: MEMORY FOR PEOPLE 155, 156-60 (R. Lindsay et al., eds. 2007), available at
http://web.uct.ac.za/depts/psychology/plato/Malpass%20Tredoux%20McQuiston%2EW%2Ha
ndbook%202007.pdf; Eyewitness Evidence, supra note 152, at 60; Recommendations, supra note
155, at 630-35; Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 163, at 7.
170 U.S DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 169, at 29.
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4.

Feedback & Confidence

Information given to witnesses prior to the lineup can influence their
accuracy;171 information presented afterwards can have a similar effect as well.
Post-identification feedback, while it does not affect the result of the
identification itself, falsely inflates the witness's confidence in his selection,
which increases the appearance of reliability to the jury. 172 Witnesses who are
given post-identification feedback (e.g., being told that he or she picked the
correct suspect) "significantly inflate their reports to suggest better witnessing
conditions at the time of the crime, stronger memory at the time of the lineup,
and sharper memory abilities in general.' 73 Witnesses have been known to also
"report they had a better view of the culprit [and] that they could make out
details of the face."' 174 Eliminating post-identification feedback is an important
goal because it will prevent jurors from being "erroneously impressed by a
falsely confident eyewitness.' 7 5
5. Multiple Viewings
By viewing the same suspect multiple times in lineups, it becomes
difficult to tell whether identifying the suspect comes from the original event's
memory or from an earlier identification procedure. 176 One problem with
multiple viewings results from two mental cognitions called mugshot exposure
and mugshot commitment.' 77 Mugshot exposure occurs when a witness first
views a set of photos, fails to identify anyone at that time, and then selects
someone at a later identification procedure who was present in the earlier

171 See supra Part IV.B.2.

172 Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, 'Good, You Identified the Suspect': Feedback to
Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 360,
372-74 (1998); see also LOFrUS ET AL., supra note 124, at 68-72.
173 Amy B. Douglass & Nancy Steblay, Memory Distortion in Eyewitnesses: A Meta-Analysis
of the Post-IdentificationFeedbackEffect, 20 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 859, 864-65 (2006);

see also LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 124, at 70; Amy B. Douglass et al., Moderators of PostIdentification Feedback Effects on Eyewitnesses' Memory Reports, 15 LEGAL & CRIMINOGLICAL
PSYCHOL. 279, 279-80 (2010); Daniel B. Wright & Elin M. Skagerberg, Postidentification
FeedbackAffects Real Eyewitnesses, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 172, 176 (2007).
174
Wells & Bradfield, supra note 172, at 374.
175 Douglass & Steblay, supra note 173, at 865; see also Recommendations, supra note 155, at
635-36.
176
See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 900 (N.J. 2011); State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 708
(Or. 2012).
177 See Kenneth A. Deffenbacher et al., Mugshot Exposure Effects: Retroactive Interference,
Mugshot Commitment, Source Confusion, and Unconscious Transference, 30 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 287, 287 (2006); see also Henderson, 27 A.3d at 900.
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photos. 178 This effect "decreases accuracy for a given witness at a subsequent
lineup, both in terms of decreased likelihood of being correct (including hit and
correct rejection rates) and increased probability of committing a false
alarm." 179
Mugshot commitment, on the other hand, occurs when a witness
identifies someone from the initial photoset who is then included in a later
lineup procedure. 180 This negatively affects a witness's accuracy because once
a witness initially selects someone he will remain committed to his initial
81 Therefore, it is
choice instead of examining other possible candidates.'
important to prevent witnesses from viewing fillers or suspects more than once.
6. Simultaneous vs. Sequential Lineups
A lineup or photo array can be presented in two forms: simultaneously
or sequentially. 8 The simultaneous lineup presents lineup participants all at
once. 183 The sequential method, instead, presents an unknown number of lineup
participants, viewed one at a time, and requires the witness to make a decision
person.184
on each lineup participant before moving on to the next
Witnesses in sequential lineups tend to make fewer selections, which
reduce false identification errors; simultaneous lineups, on the other hand,
motivate witnesses to make more identifications, thereby increasing both
accurate and inaccurate selections. 85 This increase for simultaneous lineups
results from witnesses using the relative-judgment strategy: a witness compares
the lineup members to each other and chooses the one that best matches his
memory of the suspect.' 86 Yet, this can be problematic when the real suspect is
not actually in the lineup at all. A witness, however, cannot use relativejudgments in sequential lineups because each person or picture is presented one
at a time, thus giving the witness the ultimatum of deciding whether this person

178

179

Deffenbacher et al., supra note 177, at 287; see also LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 124, at 86.
Deffenbacher et al., supra note 177, at 302; see also Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 163, at

8.
180

See Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 at 900.
Deffenbacher et al., supra note 177, at 290-91, 298; see also LOFTUS ET AL., supra note
124, at 86.
182 LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 124, at 88.
181

183

Id.

184

Id. at 88-89.

Nancy Steblay et al., Eyewitness Accuracy Rates in Sequential and Simultaneous Lineup
Presentations:A Meta-Analytic Comparison,25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 459, 464, 468-69 (2001);
see also Eyewitness Evidence, supra note 152, at 63-64.
186
Steblay et al., supra note 185, at 468-69; see also LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 124, at 88-89;
Eyewitness Evidence, supra note 152, at 63.
185
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is the suspect or not-this
may explain why witnesses in sequential lineups
87
make fewer selections.1

Some researchers still remain skeptical of recommending sequential
lineups over simultaneous lineups.1 88 However, recent research in 2011 has
reaffirmed the principle that "sequential procedure[s] reduce[] mistaken
identifications with little or no reduction in accurate identifications."' 189 Thus, it
seems sequential lineups are the better option in the long term.
7.

Facial Composites

Occasionally, a witness will work with a sketch artist or computer
program to construct a facial composite sketch of the suspect.' 90 Today,
computerized programs, like the FACES program, have replaced sketch artists
in most law enforcement agencies. 191 To use these programs, a witness
recreates the suspect's face one piece at a time. 192
Yet, despite these technological advances, "face composite[s] by an
eyewitness [are] generally a poor representation of the original face[,]" 193
leading some researchers to conclude that "building a face composite
diminishes the prospects that a person will later be able to identify that face
from a six-person lineup."' 194 This may occur because of how people process
faces. People tend to remember facial descriptions as a whole-the holistic
approach-but computerized programs, however, require the witness to
recreate the face in a piece-by-piece function.' 95 New computer programs are
187 Steblay et al., supra note 185, at 468-69.
188

See Roy S. Malpass

et al., Public Policy and Sequential Lineups, 14 LEGAL &

1, 8-11 (2009) (arguing that the "[i]nvestigation of sequential lineups
is rife with inadequate science" because current studies have not properly isolated variables and
studied them independently thus rendering results only causal connections).
189 Gary L. Wells et al., A Test of the Simultaneous vs. Sequential Lineup Methods: An Initial
Report of the AJS National Eyewitness Identification Field Studies, AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y viii,
x (2011), availableat http://www.popcenter.org/library/reading/PDFs/lineupmethods.pdf.
190 Gary L. Wells & Lisa E. Hasel, Facial Composites Production by Eyewitnesses, 16
CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYHCOL. Sci. 6, 6 (2007); see also LOFTUS El AL., supra note 124, at
84-85; Eyewitness Evidence, supra note 152, at 64.
191 Wells & Hasel, supra note 190, at 6-7.
192 Id.; see also Eyewitness Evidence, supra note 152, at 64 (FACES includes "361 hair
selections, 63 head shapes, 42 forehead lines, 410 sets of eyebrows, 514 sets of eyes, 593 noses,
561 sets of lips, 416 jaw shapes, 145 moustaches, 152 beards, 33 goatees, 127 sets of eyeglasses,
70 eye lines, 147 smile lines, 50 mouth lines, and 40 chin lines").
CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL.

193 Wells & Hasel, supra note 190, at 6; see also LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 124, at 84;

Eyewitness Evidence, supra note 152, at 64-65.
194 Gary L. Wells et al., Building Facial Composites Can Harm Lineup Identification
Performance, 11 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 147, 151 (2005).
195 See Wells & Hasel, supra note 190, at 9; see also LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 124, at 85.
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being developed that use a "whole-face" method instead of the piecemeal
method. 196
8. Showups
A showup occurs when a witness is shown a single suspect and asked
to make an identification.' 97 Compared to regular lineups, "identifications from
one-person lineups are less accurate, and put innocent suspects at more risk,
' 98
than identifications from six-person lineups."' Showups do have some value
however. If conducted immediately after the crime, showups can have similar
reliability rates as lineups.' 99 The caveat, though, is that the time window is
small because accuracy rates have been found to substantially drop only 30
minutes later.200
Despite their potential benefits, showups have been considered
"inherently suggestive," leading some states to authorize their use in only strict
circumstances.2 1 This may be due to how the suspect is presented to the
witness. Normally, a suspect is shown in handcuffs to the witness, which
0 2 With all of these
encourages the belief that he is the actual perpetrator.
dangers, a full lineup is the preferable method.

See Wells & Hasel, supra note 190, at 9 (commenting that no data is available, however,
indicating whether these whole-face programs are more effective than traditional composite
programs).
197 LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 124, at 86-87 (no fillers are present; it is only the witness and
the suspect).
198 Daniel A. Yarmey et al., Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications in Showups and Lineups,
20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 459, 468 (1996); see also LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 124, at 87; Nancy
Steblay et al., Eyewitness Accuracy Rates in Police Showup and Lineup Presentations:A MetaAnalytic Comparison,27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 523, 533 (2003); Wells & Quinlivan, supra note
163, at 7.
199 See Yarmey et al., supra note 198, at 468.
200
Id. at 468-69.
See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 903 (N.J. 2011) (citing State v. Herrera, 902 A.2d
201
177, 181 (N.J. 2006)). Wisconsin will only admit evidence from a showup if it was deemed
necessary under the totality of the circumstances. Id. (citing State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582,
584-85 (Wis. 2005)). Massachusetts requires a "good reason" for conducting a showup. Id.
(citing Commonwealth v. Martin, 850 N.E.2d 555, 562-63 (Mass. 2006)). New York suppresses
evidence from showups unless exigent circumstances exist. Id. (citing State v. Duuvon, 571
N.E.2d 654, 656 (N.Y. 1991)).
See LOvTUS ET AL., supra note 124, at 87.
202
196
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C. Outside the Court's Grasp: Estimator Variables
Unlike system variables, estimator variables are beyond the legal
system's control. 20 3 Accounting for estimator variables is important for two
reasons: (1) they are central to the understanding of why and when
eyewitnesses are more likely to make mistakes; and (2) understanding system
variables' importance is dependent on first understanding estimator
variables.2 °4 The estimator variables described here are (1) stress, (2) the
weapon focus effect, (3) exposure duration, (4) distance & lighting, (5) witness
characteristics, (6) perpetrator characteristics, (7) memory decay, (8) cross-race
identification effect, (9) co-witness statements, and (10) speed of identification.
1. Stress
Even under immaculate viewing conditions, stress can hinder an
eyewitness's ability to make an accurate identification. 20 5 An optimal stress
level exists at which human performance peaks and deviating from this impacts
performance. 206 Witnessing a crime potentially falls outside this range because
"high levels of stress negatively impact[s] both accuracy of eyewitness
identification as well as accuracy of recall of crime-related details. ' '2 °7 A 2004
experiment illustrates this effect.20 8 Over 500 military personnel members were
placed in either a high-stress interrogation (involving threats and physical
confrontation) or a low-stress interrogation; one day later, they were then asked
to identify their interrogators.20 9 In live lineups, 70% of subjects from the highstress interrogation scenario failed.2 0 It was therefore concluded that
"eyewitness memory for persons encountered during events that are personally
relevant, 1 highly stressful, and realistic in nature may be subject to substantial
21
error."

203
204
205
206

See Wells, supra note 14, at 1548.
Eyewitness Evidence, supra note 152, at 51.
Id. at 52.
See LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 124, at 30.

Kenneth A. Deffenbacher et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of the Effects of High Stress
on
Eyewitness Memory, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 687, 699 (2004); see also LOFTUS ET AL., supra
note 124, at 28-30; Eyewitness Evidence, supra note 152, at 52-53.
208
See generally Charles Morgan et al., Accuracy of Eyewitness Memory for Persons
EncounteredDuringExposure to Highly Intense Stress, 27 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 265 (2004).
209
Id. at 265-70.
210
Id. at 272.
211
Id. at 274.
207
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The Weapon Focus Effect

Weapon focus describes a witness's focused attention on a weapon,12
details of the crime.1
which diminishes the witness's ability to recall other
Compared to situations when a weapon is present, "weapon-absent condition[s]
2 13 This
accurate descriptions of the perpetrator."
214
significantly more
generate[]
•
First, weapons increase stress and anxiety above
is true for two reasons.
2 15 As discussed, increased stress often leads to inaccurate
optimal levels.
identifications. 216 Second, people are highly fixated on weapons because their
usage is mostly unexpected.217 This effect has also been found to increase when
2 18
the suspect threatens the witness while using a weapon. The weapon focus
objects have been
effect, however, does not solely pertain to weapons; unusual
as well. 219
participants
on
effect
similar
a
exert
to
found
3. Exposure Duration
The longer a person looks at something, common sense dictates the
better his memory will be. 220 One study exposed subjects to a simulated crime
for either 12 or 45 seconds; afterwards, they were instructed to identify the
suspect out of a lineup. 22' Results, as expected, revealed that longer exposure
significantly increased accuracy rates for target-present and target-absent
lineups. In addition, witnesses also have been found to actually overestimate
an incident's duration.223 Accordingly, if a witness testifies that an event lasted

See LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 124, at 33; Eyewitness Evidence, supra note 152, at 53.
213 Nancy Steblay, A Meta-Analytic Review of the Weapon Focus Effect, 16 LAw & HuM.
BEHAV. 413, 415-17 (1992); see also Jonathan M. Fawcett et al., Of Guns and Geese: A Meta212

Analytic Review of the 'Weapon Focus' Literature, 19 PSYCHOL., CRIME, & L. 35, 56 (2013),

available at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/1l0.1080/1068316X.2011.599325.
214

See LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 124, at 33.

215

Id.

216

See supraPart IV.C. 1.

217

See LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 124, at 33.

Fawcett et al, supra note 213, at 55-56.
219 Id. at 37-38, 49, 56 (describing an unusual object as "an object that was unexpected given
the context in which it was presented").
218

220

LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 124, at 19.

221

See Amina Memon et al., Exposure Duration: Effects on Eyewitness Accuracy and

Confidence, 94 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 339, 342-43 (2003).
Id. at 348; see also LOFruS ET AL., supra note 124, at 19; Eyewitness Evidence, supra note
222

152, at 53-54.
223

See LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 124, at 20-21.
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longer than it actually did, jurors may use that time frame to positively judge
the witness's recollection.224

4. Distance & Lighting
Certain environmental conditions can significantly affect an
eyewitness's reliability.2 25 Unsurprisingly, "[a]ccuracy of witness identification
decisions [are] significantly influenced by the distance between the witness and
the target at the time of exposure. 226 An increase in distance thus leads to a
decrease in correct identifications; more surprising, however, is that increases
in distance can also result in a decreased number of correct rejections in targetabsent lineups. 227 Researchers believe that witnesses who deem themselves too
far away to make an accurate identification will resort to guessing instead.22 8
In addition to distance, the amount of lighting also influences accuracy.
Witnessing an event in good lighting-as common sense suggests-leads to a
more accurate identification. 229 Witnesses are able to acquire more information
in good lighting, which enables more information to be retrieved later. 230 At
night, identifications are more difficult because not enough light is present to
activate certain receptor cells located in the eyes making objects appear to be
more coarse and undefined.231 Identifications made in daytime therefore should
be considered more reliable than those made at night.
5. Witness Characteristics: Age & Gender
It is not uncommon today to see children called to testify as witnesses.
One would assume that the younger the witness, the less reliable he would
be.232 Yet, children over age five have been discovered to have a relatively
comparable correct identification rate in target-present lineups as adults;
however, the accuracy rates drop for children under five. 233 In target-absent

225

Id. at 20.
Id. at 17, 22-24.

226

R.C.L. Lindsay et al., How Variations in Distance Affect Eyewitness Reports and

224

Identification Accuracy, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 526, 533 (2008); see also LOFTUS ET AL., supra
note 124, at 22; Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 163, at 9-10.
227
Lindsay et al., supra note 226, at 533.
228
Id. at 535.
229
See LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 124, at 17.
230

Id.

231

Id. at 17-18.

Id. at 36.
233 Joanna D. Pozzulo & R.C.L. Lindsay, Identification Accuracy of Children versus Adults:
A
Meta-Analysis, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 549, 563 (1998) [hereinafter Identification Accuracy];
see also Joanna D. Pozzulo & Julie Dempsey, Could Target Age Explain Identification Accuracy
232
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lineups though, adolescents produce a much lower correct rejection rate than
adults.2 34 A possible explanation for this is because "line-up[s] place an implicit
demand to make an 'identification' on the witness and this demand is greater
for children than adults, resulting in a higher rate of false-positive
responses. 23 5
When compared to young adults, an elderly witness's capacity to make
36 As people age, their
accurate identifications is significantly diminished.
sense of perception and awareness dwindles; accordingly, elderly witnesses are
less likely to remember details about the suspect, the victim, or the
age, elderly
environment. 37 However, when identifying a person of their own
counterparts. 238
younger
their
than
identifications
correct
more
witnesses make
Nonetheless, identifications from elderly witnesses must be treated with slight
skepticism.
Unlike age, where there is clear research support, there is no clear
distinction between which gender makes the better witness-males or
females. 239 However, both genders are more accurate on different types of
information: "[w]omen [are] more accurate and more resistant to suggestion
about female-oriented details, whereas men [are] more accurate and resistant to
' 240 Females seem to more accurately
suggestion about male-oriented details.
remember details about clothing and the victim's appearance while males, on
the other hand, are more accurate about the perpetrator and the surrounding
environment.2 4 ' This occurs because men and woman pay closer attention-and
and store more information-to things that catch more of
can therefore 24process
2
interest.
their

Differences Between Child and Adult Eyewitnesses?, 16 PSYCHIATRY,

PSYCHOL. & L. S 137, S 137

(2009) [hereinafter Target Age]; LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 124, at 38.
235

Identification Accuracy, supra note 233, at 563-65.
Target Age, supranote 233, at S137.

236

A. Daniel Yarmey, The Older Eyewitness, in

234

ELDERS, CRIME, AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE

SYSTEM: MYTHS, PERCEPTIONS, AND REALITY IN THE 21 ST CENTURY
al., eds. 2000); see also LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 124, at 40.
Yarmey, supra note 236, at 130, 133.
237

127, 133 (Max B. Rothman et

238

Id. at 135.

239

See LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 124, at 41.
Peter A. Powers et al., Eyewitness Accounts of Females and Males, 64 J. APPLIED

240

PSYCHOL. 339, 339 (1979).
241 Id. at 344; see also LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 124, at 42.

242 Powers et al., supra note 240, at 345-46; see also LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 124, at 42.
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6.

Perpetrator Characteristics

Disguises, ranging from sunglasses to clothing, are enough to lower an
eyewitness's accuracy.24 3 For example, the number of correct identifications in
one study dropped from 57% to 44% when the suspect's hair and hairline were
covered using a hat or hood. 2 " One characteristic that can affect eyewitnesses
is the presence of facial hair. Another study found that an eyewitness's
accuracy lowered if facial features, like a suspect growing facial hair, changed
between the incident and recall.245
7.

Memory Decay

Memories never improve, and as time progresses, "memory strength
will be weaker at longer retention intervals than at briefer ones. 246 Labeled the
forgetting curve, people forget new information soon after learning it; the
amount they later forget levels off as time continues.2 47 The difference in
reliability then between an identification made ten minutes and two hours after
an incident may be substantially greater than the reliability between an
identification made two weeks and two months after the same incident.248
Progression of time alone, however, is not the sole reason for memory
loss; forgetting is mostly caused by what occurs during that time passage.249
This phenomenon is called interference: new information prevents a person
from remembering the original, stored information. 250 Estimating the power of
memory decay, however, depends on the initial memory encoded during the
acquisition stage because a witness can only forget information that was

243

See Eyewitness Evidence, supra note 152, at 54.

244

See Brian L. Cutler, A Sample Of Witness, Crime, and Perpetrator Characteristics

Affecting Eyewitness Identification Accuracy, 4 CARDOZO PuB. L. POL'Y & ETHICs J. 327,332-33

(2006).
245
K. E. Patterson & A. D. Baddeley, When Face Recognition Fails, 3 J.

EXPERIMENTAL

PSYCHOL.: HUM. LEARNING & MEMORY 406, 414-16 (1977); see also LOFTUs ET AL., supra note

124, at 82-83.
246
Kenneth A. Deffenbacher et al., Forgettingthe Once-Seen Face: Estimating the Strength of
an Eyewitness's Memory Representation, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 139, 142

(2008); see also Eyewitness Evidence, supranote 152, at 54.
247

HERMANN EBBINGHAUS, MEMORY: A CONTRIBUTION TO EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 76-

79 (1913); see also LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 124, at 51-52.
248

See LoFrus ET AL., supra note 124, at 52; see also State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673, 705 (Or.

2012).
249
LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 124, at 55.
250

Id. at 54.
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properly encoded to begin with. 25 1 Therefore, memory decay must be examined
in combination with the other variables that affect the acquisition stage. 252
8. Cross-Race Identification Effect
A potential indicator of an accurate identification is whether the
253
eyewitness and the person identified share the same race or ethnicity. People
of one race (e.g., Caucasian) have a harder time recognizing people of a
different race (e.g., African-American).2 54 This discrepancy originates from a
2 55
mental cognition called the out-group homogeneity effect. The out-group
homogeneity effect is "the phenomenon that members of out-groups are
generally seen as less variable and less diverse than members of in-groups";
this effect thus makes majority race individuals view out-group members of a
minority race as similar to each other than in-group members of the majority
race.

2 56

There are many possible explanations for this effect. One is that people
encode better information about their own race, when compared to other races,
257
and create a better representation for what their own race looks like. Other
explanations are that different races have common distinctive features amongst
race. 58
themselves or perhaps people just pay less attention to others of another
minority races are wrongfully convicted more often
This could explain why
259
than non-minorities.

251

Lawson, 291 P.3d at 705.

Id. (the other variables include cross-race bias, the weapon focus effect, distance, lighting,
and duration).
Kathy Pezdek et al., Cross-Race (But Not Same-Race) Face Identification Is Impaired by
253
PresentingFaces in a Group Rather than Individually, 36 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 488, 488 (2012).
See Christian A. Meissner & John C. Brigham, Thirty Years of Investigating the Own-Race
254
252

Bias in Memory for Faces: A Meta-Analytic Review, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 3, 21-22
(2001); LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 124, at 100-03; Eyewitness Evidence, supra note 152, at 52.
255 Pezdek et al., supra note 253, at 489.
256

Id.

Id. at 493; see Meissner & Brigham, supra note 254, at 22-23.
258 See Arthur L. Rizer III, The Race Effect on Wrongful Convictions, 29 WM. MITCHELL L.
REv. 845,855 (2003); see also LOFTUS ET AL., supra note 124.
259 See Valena Elizabeth Beety, What the Brain Saw: The Case of Trayvon Martin and the
Need for Eyewitness Identification Reform, 90 DENY. U. L. REv. 3 31, 341-42 (2012); Rizer, supra
note 258, at 857-60.
257
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9.

Co-Witness Statements

Post-identification feedback, as already discussed in Part IV.B.4, can
affect an eyewitness's identification. 260 However, this feedback does not have
to strictly come from an authoritative figure like a law enforcement officer.2 6'
When more than one witness is present, discussion about the suspect's identify
can "influence an individual's subsequent judgments despite lack of
262
confirmation regarding whether they had made a correct identification.,
Thus, witnesses who speak amongst themselves about what each saw are more
"susceptible to misinformation from their co-witness and, as a consequence,
produce[] less accurate recall accounts . .,26
This is especially true if the
witnesses are previously acquainted with one another because acquaintances
are "significantly more likely to incorporate information obtained solely from
their co-witness into their own accounts. 264
The hindsight bias may explain a witness's influence over another.265
The hindsight bias refers to how people view details leading up to the event
when they know what the outcome of the event will be; if each witness agrees
on the suspect's identify, then each reasonably concurs that they must have
paid close attention to the crime if they both ended up at the same
conclusion.26 6 This can lead to highly inflated opinions of their reliability,
which can then lead to a witness's increased willingness to testify at trial.267
Witnesses therefore should be separated from one another or should be
refrained from speaking to each other about what each saw.
10. Speed of Identification
Also called response latency, "witnesses who make accurate
identifications from lineups do so faster than do those who make inaccurate
identifications. ,,268 No general time frame exists though. Reasoning that
260
261

See supra Part IV.B.4.
Elin M. Skagerberg, Co-Witness Feedback in Line-Ups, 21

APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL.

489, 494 (2007).
262

Id.

263 Lorraine Hope et al., "With a Little Help from my Friends... ": The Role of Co- Witness
Relationship in Susceptibility to Misinformation, 127 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 476, 481 (2008); see
also Helen M. Paterson & Richard I. Kemp, Comparing Methods of Encountering Post-Event
Information: The Power of Co-Witness Suggestion, 20 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 1083,

1095-98 (2006).
264 Hope et al., supra note 263, at 481.
265 See Skagerberg, supra note 261, at 495.
266

Id.

267

Id. at 495-96.

268

Eyewitness Evidence, supra note 152, at 67 (citations omitted).
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automatic decision-making is more indicative of accurate identification, one
study concluded that more accurate identifications were made within 10 to 12
seconds.269 But, another study concluded that the time range for accurate
identifications can occur between 5 and 29 seconds.27 0 While it is still generally
agreed upon that faster identifications are more accurate, the problem is
determining what "fast" means.
From describing how memory functions to system and estimator
variables, these scientific findings represent over 30 years of research revealing
eyewitness's true accuracy. However, the Supreme Court still believes that
constitutional safeguards at trial can adequately protect innocent defendants
from unreliable eyewitnesses. 271 The West Virginia legal system, on the other
hand, cannot continue to turn a blind eye to this empirical data.
V.

TIME FOR WEST VIRGINIA To BREAK FROM THE SUPREME COURT

The Supreme Court has described eyewitness misidentification as "the
primary evil to be avoided., 272 As the number of wrongful convictions climb,
continued use of the Manson test renders this statement meaningless. It is
imperative that West Virginia moves away from the Manson test. Part V.A
therefore explains the Manson test's ineffectiveness while Part V.B describes
the new framework that West Virginia courts should adopt.
A.

West Virginia Must Reject the Manson Test

New Jersey, Oregon, and Massachusetts demonstrate that different
approaches today can improve upon the outdated Manson test. The Manson test
may have been adequate in 1977, but 30 years of extensive research has since
rendered it ineffective. Three reasons exist why West Virginia needs to reject
the Manson test.
1. The "Biggers Factors" are Misleading
The five Biggers factors-opportunity to view, degree of attention,
accuracy of prior description, level of certainty, length of time between incident
and identification-are poor indicators of a witness's reliability. First, three of
the five factors are self-reports: the witness must report on what his view of the

See David Dunning & Scott Perretta, Automaticity and Eyewitness Accuracy: A 10- to 12Second Rule for Distinguishing Accurate from Inaccurate Positive Identifications, J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 87,951-62 (2002).
270
Nathan Weber et al., Eyewitness Identification Accuracy and Response Latency: The
Unruly 10-12 Second Rule, J. APPLIED EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 139, 143-46 (2004).
271 See Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S.Ct. 716, 728-29 (2012).
272
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972).
269
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crime was, how close he paid attention, and how certain he is in the
identification.273 Yet, self-reports should not be considered reliable.2 74 Is it not
odd "that an eyewitness, whose credibility as a witness is being assessed, would
be asked to report on his or her own credibility?

'27 5

In addition, these three

factors are also a product of the suggestive procedure itself-the same
procedure a court would be evaluating using the Manson test. 27 6 Thus, it is

nearly impossible for a court to separate the two procedures from one another.
Second, the Biggers factors completely ignore what research has
uncovered: other variables distort memory. A witness's degree of attention can
be distracted due to stress or the presence of a weapon.277 A witness's level of
certainty is unrelated to accuracy levels because, for example, co-witness
statements or post-identification feedback can inflate a witness's confidence in
his identification.278 A witness's opportunity to view the crime can be affected
by distance, the amount of lighting present, duration, or even the suspect's
race. 279 All these have been found to detrimentally affect a witness's
accuracy. 280 By viewing just the Biggers factors alone, courts using the Manson
test effectively isolate themselves from every other detail that can influence a
witness.
2. Reasons for Applying Manson No Longer Exist
When endorsing the Manson test over the per se exclusionary rule, the
Supreme Court believed that juries would be able to tell the difference between
questionable and non-questionable identification evidence, and that the Manson
test would deter law enforcement agencies from using suggestive identification
procedures. 28' Unfortunately, the opposite has occurred.
Eyewitness evidence has an immense impact on jurors. When using
eyewitness evidence in court, "there is almost nothing more convincing than a
live human being who takes the stand, points a finger at the defendant, and

273

See Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 163, at 9.

274

Id. (commenting that self-reports are not reliable because the witness may change his

answer based on the situation, how socially desirable the answers are, and by trying to remain
consistent with past answers).
275
Id.
276
Id. at 9, 16 (suggestive identification procedures can inflate a witness's self-reports); see
infra Part V.A.2.
277
Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 163, at 10-11; see supra Part IV.C. 1-2.
278
Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 163, at 11-12; see supra Parts IV.B.4, IV.C.9.
279
Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 163, at 9-10; see supra Parts IV.C.3-4, 8.
280
See supra Part 1V.B-C.
281
See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 111-13 (1977).
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says, 'That's the one!' ' 282 Adding a single eyewitness to a case skyrockets the
probability that the jury will convict the defendant. When compared to other
types of evidence, convictions were highest among cases involving
284
eyewitnesses when compared to those using different types of experts.
Yet, jurors remain blind to the dangers of this evidence. Several
misconceptions about eyewitness evidence still permeate through jurors'
minds. Jurors believe witnesses under stress remember details better.2 85 Jurors
believe witnesses underestimate the duration of events.2 86 Jurors believe that
the more confident a witness is, the more accurate he is. 287 All three are
wrong.288 But somehow the Manson test remains "content to rely upon the
good sense and judgment of American juries" believing they "are not so
susceptible that they cannot measure intelligently the weight of identification
testimony that has some questionable feature. 28 9 Its faith is grossly misplaced.
Research has since concluded that jurors cannot consistently distinguish
accurate versus inaccurate eyewitnesses. 290 Juries thus cannot be solely trusted
with such crucial evidence without guidance. This is where excluding
unreliable identification evidence along with jury instructions comes into play.
Finally, the Manson test does not deter suggestive identification
procedures. Deterrence, by its definition, must decrease the probability that the
identification will be admitted for the effect to properly work. 29 , However, the
exact opposite occurs. As already discussed, the three Biggers factors
(certainty, view, attention) are self-reports made by the eyewitness; these selfreports, however, are products of the suggestive procedures themselves.292
These suggestive procedures therefore do not deter police from using theminstead, police unknowingly may be encouraged to use them because these
procedures inflate the witness's certainty, their view, and degree of attention.293
282

Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting LOFTUS,

supra note 31, at 19).
283

LOFTUS ET AL.,

supra note 124, at 119 (finding that adding one eyewitness increases

percentage of guilt from 18% to 72%).
Id. at 123 (the other experts were a fingerprint analyst, polygraph expert, and handwriting
284
expert).

287

Id. at 125-26.
Id.
Id. at 126.

288

See supra Parts 1V.B.4, IV.C. 1, 3.

289

Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 116 (1977).

290

BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE EYEWITNESS,

285
286

PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW 181-86 (1 st ed. 1995).
See Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 163, at 17.
291
292

Id. at 9, 16.

293

Id. at 17. This is not in any way asserting that police intentionally use suggestive

identification procedures because it will increase the chance the evidence will be admitted; this is
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Because of these inflated scores, a judge using the Manson test to assess the
evidence's reliability would more than likely admit it because, based on the
Biggers factors, it would seem like the identification was in fact reliable.2 94
With seemingly no threat of exclusion, the Manson test subtly provides an
incentive to use the very suggestive procedures it was created to eliminate. 295
3. Manson & PerryIgnore Thirty Years of Scientific Research
Despite over 2,000 studies conducted since Manson, this data
296
inexplicitly "merits barely a parenthetical mention" by the Supreme Court.
The Court's apparent aversion to scientific data is bewildering because
landmark court decisions in the past have relied on such research before. 297 in
Brown v. Board of Education,29 the Court overturned the "separate but equal
doctrine" in public schools after research revealed "the detrimental effect"
segregation had on African-American children.299 More recently in Roper v.
Simmons, 300 the Court held that sentencing juveniles to the death penalty
violated the Eighth Amendment because research concluded that youths lack
maturity, are more susceptible to negative influences, and that their brains are
underdeveloped.30 1
Why does the Court now decide to turn its back on 30 years of
research? It cannot argue that the research is underdeveloped or untrustworthy.
This data has "been tested and retested, subjected to scientific scrutiny through
peer-reviewed journals, evaluated through the lens of meta-analyses, and
replicated at times in real-world settings. 3 °2 Its validity has furthermore been
recently re-established in a brand new report released in late Fall 2014 from the

simply stating that any police officer would want a witness who has confidence, paid close
attention to the crime, and reported having a good view of everything that happened.
294
295

Id.
Id.

296 Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 738 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
297
See Shari R. Berkowitz & Naser L. Javaid, It's Not You, It's the Law: Eyewitness Memory
Scholars' Disappointment with Perry v. New Hampshire, 19 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y, & L. 369,
375 (2013).
298
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
299
Id. at 494 ("A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation

with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to (retard) the educational and mental
development of Negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in
a racial(ly) integrated school system."); see also Berkowitz & Javaid, supra note 297, at 375.
300
543 U.S. 551 (2005).
301 Id. at 569-70; see also Berkowitz & Javaid, supra note 297, at 375.
302

State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 916 (N.J. 2011) (calling it the "gold standard in terms of

the applicability of social science research to the law").
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National Academy of Sciences.30 3 In addition, New Jersey, Oregon, and
Massachusetts are not the only courts to rely on identification research; other
courts across the country have relied upon it as well. 30 4 Yet, the "highest court
in the land" chooses not to. West Virginia should not repeat the Supreme
Court's mistake by following this narrow viewpoint.
B. The Proposed Standard To ChallengeIdentificationEvidence in West
Virginia
West Virginia should incorporate procedures used by New Jersey,
Oregon, and Massachusetts. If adopted, West Virginia would take a giant step
forward in preventing the "primary evil" that the Supreme Court initially
wanted to avoid.
1. Obtaining a Pretrial Hearing
In West Virginia, a defendant has one way to challenge the reliability
of identification evidence: present evidence of suggestive identification
procedures.30 5 Instead of a narrow, one-way approach, there should be three
distinct opportunities for a defendant to have a hearing on the reliability of
identification evidence. This Part explains each.
i.

Police Fail To Follow the Eyewitness IdentificationAct

A defendant should be granted a hearing if the law enforcement agency
conducting the identification procedure has not yet adopted guidelines under
the Eyewitness Identification Act. As of January 1, 2014, all West Virginia law
enforcement agencies that conduct eyewitness identification procedures are
required to "adopt specific written procedures for conducting photo lineups,
live lineups and showups." 30 6 If a defendant presents evidence to the contrary,
then that identification evidence should be excluded at a hearing unless it can
be shown by clear and convincing evidence that the identification "is the
product of a source independent of the tainted procedure and is reliable. 30 7

303

See generally THE NATIONAL

ACADEMY

OF

SCIENCES,

IDENTIFYING

THE CULPRIT:

at http://sites.nationalacademies.org/
PGA/stl/EyewitnessID/index.htrm
304 See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 917 (other courts, to name a few, include the federal Seventh
Circuit, Third Circuit, and Middle District of Alabama, and state courts in Arizona, California,
D.C., New York, Tennessee, and Utah).
305 E.g., State v. Spence, 388 S.E.2d 498, 503-04 (W. Va. 1989).
306 W. VA. CODE §§ 62-1E-1 to -3 (2014).
307
COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., supra note 84, at 111; see also United States v. Wade, 388
ASSESSING EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION (2014), available

U.S. 218, 240 (1967).
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Although very drastic, this exclusionary rule is appropriate. First, this
option will rarely, if ever, be applied because most agencies have presumably
complied with the statute. Second, law enforcement agencies have had since
July 2013 to create identification procedures; no excuse exists for not having
these ready for 2014, especially when the statute itself lists recommendations
that the police may use. 308 Without "specific written procedures" guiding
police, a witness being unknowingly influenced potentially increases; research
has demonstrated that many variables affecting witness's accuracy come from
police interaction. 30 9 The statute was enacted to decrease misidentificationsnot adopting these procedures defeats this purpose.
Exclusionary rules are not unheard of for identification evidence.
Implementing such a rule reverts back to the "Wade Trilogy" decisions where
the Supreme Court held in Gilbert that "only a per se exclusionary rule ...can
be an effective sanction to assure that law enforcement authorities will respect
the accused's constitutional rights.. ,."0In addition, an exclusionary rule
here would fully deter agencies from not complying with the statute to avoid
crucial evidence being excluded. Deterrence was one of the focal points behind
311
the Manson test.
ii. Police Do Not Follow ProperIdentificationProcedures
A defendant should be granted a pretrial hearing if evidence of any
system variable is presented.3 12 A defendant would be able to earn a hearing if,
for example, the lineup administrator provided post-identification feedback,
used biased lineup instructions, or did not construct the lineup with the correct
number of fillers.3 13 These system variables are extremely important to
examine because of their negative effect on a witness's memory.3 4 While it
can be argued that allowing hearings for any system variable will undoubtedly
slow the court system, the Eyewitness Identification Act should reduce the
occurrence of system variables because police are supposed to now follow a
strict set of guidelines.3 15 Yet, a new standard is still needed in case the adopted
guidelines are not properly followed.
While the list discussed in Part IV.B contains the most common
variables, it is not intended to be exclusive. As research continues to develop,

308

See supra note 76 for a list of recommendations.

309

See supra Part IV.B.

310

Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 273 (1967).

311

See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112 (1977).

312

See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 920 (N.J. 2011).

313

Id.

314

See supra Part IV.B.

315

See W. VA. CODE § 62-1E-3 (2014).

at 920-21.
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courts should not strictly adhere to the ones listed here. For the courts to
consider a new variable, there must be ample support behind it. As New Jersey
noted in Henderson, the research must be published in peer-reviewed journals,
be generally accepted by the scientific community, be replicated in real-world
scenarios, and be subject to meta-analysis studies as well. 316 Peer-reviewed
journals ensure the "validity and reliability of experimental research," and
meta-analyses ensure that the data results can be generalized to a larger
population size.17

Once evidence is presented, the court would examine both system and
estimator variables together.318 As previously discussed, system variables are
not the only things that distort a witness's memory.31 9 Examining estimator
variables as well would allow the identification evidence to be properly and
thoroughly scrutinized. In addition, this will deter police officers from making
similar mistakes in the future knowing that their actions could lead to a fullfledged hearing.
While it is normally the jury's job to weigh the evidence's credibility,
research has shown that most juries do not fully understand the impact such
Court thinks,
variables have on eyewitnesses. 320 Despite what the Supreme
321
foolproof.
100%
not
are
trial
at
constitutional safeguards
iii. UncorroboratedEyewitness & Estimator Variables Present
A defendant should be granted a pretrial hearing if there is a single
eyewitness and estimator variables are detected.322 Although the Supreme
Court believes otherwise, police actions are not the only things that can affect
an eyewitness's memory: stress, distance, co-witness statements, human
memory, and the perpetrator's characteristics all have been shown to influence
witnesses in some way.323 However, estimator variables alone should not
trigger pretrial hearings because every case involving an eyewitness will
undoubtedly involve a number of these variables. To prevent defendants from
filing motions for pretrial hearings-a fear shared by the New Jersey court324_
316

Henderson, 27 A.3d at 892-94.

317

Id. at 893. A meta-analysis is "a synthesis of all obtainable data collected in a specified

topical area." Id.
318

Id. at 922.

319

See supra Part IV.C.

See Berkowitz & Javaid, supra note 297, at 373-74.
321 See Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 728-29 (2012); see also Berkowitz & Javaid,
supra note 297, at 373-74 (noting that closing arguments, cross-examination and other trial
techniques may not convince a jury to disregard a faulty eyewitness).
320

322

See COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., supra note 84, at 47.

323

See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 728; see supra Part IV.C.
See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 923 (N.J. 2011).

324
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defendants must also fulfill an additional requirement: the eyewitness's
identification must be uncorroborated.
Hence, the defendant must show that the witness's uncorroborated
identification was unreliable due to the presence of an estimator variable. This
can involve asking, for example, whether a weapon was present, whether it was
a cross-racial identification, or how much time had passed between the crime
and identification. 32 5 Uncorroborated identifications coupled with estimator
variables are among the most dangerous types of identifications because the
jury will only be influenced by that one witness; without another witness to
support the testimony, no one will exactly know for sure just how accurate that
one witness was.
2.

Burden on the State & Defendant

After the defendant presents enough evidence to obtain a hearing, the
State should then offer evidence demonstrating that the identification is still
reliable despite the presence of both system and estimator variables.3 26 Having
the State demonstrate reliability directly complies with the Supreme Court's
notion that "reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of
identification testimony ....
,,327
However, the defendant should still have the overall burden to prove a
"substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification" to have the evidence
excluded.32 8 To accomplish this, the defendant can present expert witnesses,
cross-examine police officials, cross-examine eyewitnesses, and present other
witnesses and other relevant evidence all linked to both system and estimator
variables. Following this, the decision then rests with the judge.
3. Power of the Judge: Intermediate Remedies & Jury Instructions
During these pretrial hearings, the judge continues the principle of
being a "gatekeeper" by maintaining a high amount of discretion. 32 Because of
the predictable increase in the number of hearings, the judge therefore has the
power to end the hearing at any time if the defendant's claim is proven
baseless. 330 Allowing the judge to end hearings relatively quickly if the
defendant has no claim should somewhat alleviate the fear that the increase in
hearings would clog and slow the judicial system.

325
326

327
328
329
330

Id. at 921.
Id. at 879-82, 920.
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).
See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 879-82.
See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 920.
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At the end of the State's and defendant's arguments, the judge will then
weigh the totality of the circumstances accounting for both system and
estimator variables. Three options are now available: (1) the identification can
be excluded; (2) the identification can be admitted; or (3) an intermediate
remedy can be used.
If an intermediate remedy is used, the judge can either allow expert
331
testimony or limit the eyewitness's testimony at trial. For example, if the
witness testifies about receiving post-identification feedback then the judge will
allow the witness to testify about the identification but not about their level of
certainty.
If the identification is admitted, then the judge must charge the jury
with specific jury instructions. With "[j]urors seldom enter[ing] a courtroom
with the knowledge that eyewitness identifications are unreliable," and because
"this reality is outside 'the jury's common knowledge,' and often contradicts
jurors' 'commonsense' understandings," these instructions must be properly
worded and timely delivered.3 32 Besides being given at the end of trial, these
instructions may also be given after the witness testifies under the judge's
discretion.
VI. CONCLUSION

Eyewitnesses play a crucial role in the criminal justice system. In some
cases, eyewitnesses may be the difference between conviction and acquittal.
Nonetheless, eyewitnesses are not perfect. Human memory is not infallible.
Both law enforcement officers and the surrounding environment can
significantly distort an eyewitness's accuracy: the volumes of current research
out there support this. Yet, the Supreme Court in Manson, and later in Perry,
ignored this and remained committed to traditional-but outdated-beliefs. As
a result, innocent people in West Virginia, much like Gerald Davis, Dewey
Davis, William O'Dell Harris, Larry Holdern, and Glen Woodall, continue to
be sentenced to prison for crimes they did not commit.
The proposed changes outlined in Part V accomplish what the legal
system refuses to do: change the Manson test. By providing more opportunities
to scrutinize identification evidence and educate jurors on the issues
accompanying such evidence, the number of innocent defendants convicted
from an unreliable eyewitness may one day decrease. Before this can happen,
however, the courts must stop turning a blind eye and be receptive to change.
John Henry Wigmore, former dean of Northwestern Law School, once said,
"When the psychologists are ready for the courts, the courts will be ready for
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the psychologists. 3 33 Researchers, psychologists, and scientists have been
ready for the past 30 years-West Virginia needs to listen.
JaredT. Dotson *
VII. APPENDIX: SAMPLE JURY INSTRUCTIONS

The following is a list of sample jury instructions created by the
Innocence Project issued in their brief to the Supreme Court addressing how
judges should charge the jury on eyewitness evidence.3 34 These instructions are
not a final product and are instead to be used as guidelines.

[Preliminary guideline: This Instruction will need to be tailored to fit the facts
of the case with respect to the issues of identification.]
One of the most important issues in this case is the identification of the accused
as the perpetrator of the crime.
[(Defendant) as part of [his/her] general denial of guilt contends that the State
has not presented sufficient reliable evidence to establish beyond a reasonable
doubt that [he/she] is the person who committed the alleged offense. The State
has the burden of proving the identity of the person who committed the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. For you to find this defendant guilty, the State must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that this defendant is the person who
committed the crime. The defendant has neither the burden nor the duty to
show that the crime, if committed, was committed by someone else, or to prove
the identity of that other person. You must determine, therefore, not only
whether the State has proved each and every element of the offense charged
beyond a reasonable doubt, but also whether the State has proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that this defendant is the person who committed it.]
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[The State has presented the testimony of [insert name of witness who
identified defendant]. You will recall that this witness identified the defendant
in court as the person who committed [insert the offense(s) charged]. The State
also presented testimony that on a prior occasion before this trial, this witness
identified the defendant as the person who committed this offense [these
offenses]. According to the witness, [his/her] identification of the defendant
was based upon the observations and perceptions that [he/she] made of the
perpetrator at the time the offense was being committed. You may consider that
eyewitnesses are often not able to accurately recall the source of their
memories. In other words, their belief that the identification was based on
observations at the time of offense may be wrong. When a witness makes an
identification, that witness is expressing an opinion that may be accurate or that
may be inaccurate: that the person identified is the person who committed a
crime. Eyewitnesses can be truthful, but mistaken. Eyewitness mistakes have
long been - and continue to be - the leading cause of wrongful convictions.
Even where a witness believes that her testimony is accurate, it is your function
to determine whether the witness' identification of the defendant is reliable, or
whether it is based on a mistake or for any reason is not worthy of belief.
Witness Certainty
Although nothing may appear more convincing than a witness's categorical
identification of a perpetrator, you must critically analyze such testimony. Such
identifications, even if made in good faith, may be mistaken. Indeed, an
eyewitness's' confidence in his or her identification is a weak predictor of the
accuracy of his or her identification. Witnesses can be highly confident, but
mistaken. Therefore, when analyzing such testimony, be advised that a
witness's level of confidence, standing alone, may not be an indication of the
reliability of the identification.
In evaluating the identifications, you should consider the observations and
perceptions on which the identifications were based, and the witness' ability to
make those observations and perceptions. If you determine that the out-of-court
identification is not reliable, you may still consider whether the witness' incourt identification of the defendant is reliable. If you find that the in-court
identification is based on the witness having seen the defendant at the out-ofcourt identification procedure, rather than the result of the witness'
observations or perceptions of the perpetrator during the commission of the
offense, you should not afford the in-court identification any weight. Likewise,
you should consider the circumstances under which the witness attempted to
observe and perceive the perpetrator before deciding how much, if any, weight
should be given to the in-court identification. You should bear in mind that incourt identifications are generally less reliable than other identifications
because they occur furthest in time from the incident, the witness has most
likely already seen the defendant in an earlier procedure, and they are

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol117/iss2/10

46

Dotson: The Linchpin of Identification Evidence: The Unreliability of Eye
2014]

THE LINCHPIN OF IDENTIFICATIONEVIDENCE

inherently suggestive, as the person in the courtroom suspected of having
committed the offense is usually self-evident to even the casual observer. The
ultimate issues of the accuracy of both the in-court and out-of-court
identifications are for you to decide.
To decide whether the identification testimony is sufficiently reliable evidence
upon which to conclude that this defendant is the person who committed the
offense[s] charged, you should evaluate the testimony of the witness in light of
the factors that I have already explained to you. In addition, you should
consider the following:
Memory Does Not Work Like a Videotape
Memory is not recorded, stored, or played back in the same way as a videotape.
Memory is much more of a selective process. People do not recall entire events,
but rather reconstruct them. People often preserve pieces of information in their
memory and fill in any gaps with information they learn after having formed
the original memory.
Post-Event Information
What information did the witness receive about the event, suspect, or
perpetrator after the incident? What information did the witness receive about
the event, suspect, or perpetrator after the identification procedure? Witnesses'
memories for events and facial details, as well as their confidence in their
identifications, are easily tainted, distorted, or completely altered by visual and
verbal information that the witness receives after the event and/or identification
procedure. The source of the information is irrelevant; it can come from the
police and prosecutors, but it can also come from other witnesses, family
members, and the media. There is a danger that witnesses will incorporate postevent information into their memories even if the information is incorrect.
Witnesses are typically not aware that they have incorporated post-event info
into their memories. Exposure to incorrect information after an event can lead
witnesses to misremember events and people, and thereby increase the risk of
mistaken identification.
Confirming Feedback
Providing "confirming feedback" to a witness, such as the police conveying to
a witness, verbally or non-verbally, that he or she made a correct identification,
can make the witness more confident in the accuracy of that identification, even
if the witness had identified an innocent person. In addition, conveying to a
witness that he or she made a correct identification can also alter the witness's
memory for the event, for instance by making the witness think he or she had a
better opportunity to observe the perpetrator, got a better look at the
perpetrator's face, and paid more attention to the perpetrator, than he or she
actually did. In this way, conveying to a witness that he or she made a correct
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identification can increase the chance that an innocent person is wrongly
convicted. You should take this into account when evaluating the reliability of
the identification evidence in this case.
[if the court has not precluded a witness's testimonial statement of certainty
despite the failure of law enforcement to record a statement of certainty
contemporaneous with the witness's identification:]
Because a witness's confidence in her identification can be falsely inflated by
feedback the witness receives about the alleged accuracy of her identification,
the police should record, at the time of the witness's identification and in the
witness's own words, the witness's certainty about her identification. In this
case, the police failed to document the witness's confidence at the time of the
identification. Failure to take a certainty statement means you have no
information about whether the witness was confident at the time of the out-ofcourt identification, and thus makes it impossible to determine whether
subsequent statements of certainty by the witness have been falsely inflated.
Therefore, you should disregard the witness's testimony regarding her degree
of confidence in her identification.
Co-Witness Contamination
Was the witness exposed to opinions, descriptions, or identifications given by
other witnesses, to photographs or newspaper accounts, or to any other
information or influence that may have affected the independence of his/her
identification? There is a danger that a witness will incorporate this information
into her memory of the event, thus altering her memory of the event.
Pre- Trial Identifications Generally
You must determine the "reliability" of the pre-trial identification (the lineup,
show- up or photo-spread). You should consider the following:
Out-of-Court Identification
You must consider the "reliability" of the pre-trial identification process
involving the witness, as the process that was used might make the courtroom
identification which you heard during the trial more or less reliable. In this
case, the witness [attended a lineup], [looked at photographs of possible
suspects], and/or [was shown a single individual in a "show-up."] You should
consider the circumstances of this out-of- court identification, and whether or
not it was the product of a suggestive procedure, including everything done or
said by law enforcement to the witness before, during, or after the identification
process.
In making this determination you should consider the following circumstances:
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Whether anything was said to the witness prior to viewing a photo array, lineup or showup;
PrejudicialDisclosure of Information about Defendant to Witness
Did the police investigators say or do anything during the photo array, line-up
or showup that would "suggest" that the defendant was the perpetrator? During
the identification procedure, did the police reveal to the witness information
regarding [defendant's] prior arrest? Disclosure of this information during an
identification procedure is highly prejudicial and can increase the chance that a
suspect will be identified even if the suspect is innocent. You should take the
failure of the police to conceal this information from the witness into account
when evaluating the reliability of the identification evidence in this case.
Double-Blind
Did the officer who conducted the lineup or photo-spread know who was the
police suspect? [Or: In this case, the person administering the lineup knew who
the police suspect was.]
A lineup administrator who knows which lineup member is the police suspect
may inadvertently convey this knowledge to the witness, thereby increasing the
chance that the witness will identify the suspect even if the suspect is innocent.
For this reason, the Attorney General Guidelines require that lineups and photospreads should be conducted by an officer who does not know the identity of
the suspect to avoid any possibility that the officer will influence the witness to
identify that suspect. By using an officer who knew the identity of the suspect,
the police increased the chance of an erroneous identification. You should take
this into account when evaluating the reliability of the identification evidence
in this case.
Admonition to Witness
Was the witness informed, prior to viewing the show-up, lineup, or photospread, informed that the perpetrator might not be among the people in the
display and that the witness should not feel compelled to make an
identification?
[Or: In this case, the police failed to give a warning that perpetrator may or may
not be in the lineup and that the witness should not feel compelled to make an
identification.]
Psychological studies have shown that implying to a witness that a suspect is
present in an identification procedure or failing to warn the witness that the
perpetrator may or may not be in the procedure increases the likelihood that the
witness will select one of the individuals in the procedure, even when the
perpetrator is not present. For this reason, the Attorney General Guidelines
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require that the police warn the witness that the perpetrator may not be in the
lineup and that therefore the witness should not feel compelled to make an
identification. The failure of the identification procedure administrator to
follow this provision of the Guidelines tends to increase the probability of a
misidentification.
You should take this into account when evaluating the reliability of the
identification evidence in this case.
FillerSelection
Did the photo array shown to the witness contain multiple photographs of the
defendant?
Were "all in the lineup but the [defendant] known to the identifying witness?"
In a fair lineup all lineup members should match the eyewitness's pre-lineup
description of the perpetrator, and the defendant should not stand out unfairly.
For this reason, the Attorney General Guidelines recommend that fillers (nonsuspects) generally fit the witness' description of the perpetrator." In this case,
the police failed to select the lineup fillers to match the descriptive
characteristics provided by the witness [and/or did not select fillers in such a
way that avoided the defendant standing out]. Failure to select fillers in this
way can cause an innocent suspect to stand out unfairly and thus increases the
chance of an erroneous identification. You should take this failure into account
when evaluating the reliability of the identification evidence in this case.
Was "only the [defendant] required to wear distinctive clothing which the
culprit allegedly wore?"
Number of Fillers
In this case, the police used only X fillers in the lineup procedure. The Attorney
General Guidelines call for using a minimum of X for a [photo/live] lineup
procedure. Failure to construct a [photo/live] lineup with a minimum of X
fillers increases the chance that an innocent suspect will be identified. You
should take this into account when evaluating the reliability of the
identification evidence in this case.
Multiple Viewings
When a witness views an innocent suspect in multiple identification
procedures, the witness's memory of the actual perpetrator can be replaced by
the witness's memory of the innocent person seen in the multiple procedures.
In other words, the witness's memory trace of the innocent person can become
stronger than the witness's memory trace of the actual perpetrator. In this way,
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when a witness views an innocent suspect in multiple identification procedures,
the risk of mistaken identification is increased.
FillerIdentificationsand Non-Identifications
Was the witness's identification made spontaneously and remain consistent
thereafter?
If you find the witness failed to pick out the defendant during an identification
procedure, or
If you find the witness picked out a different person than the defendant at an
identification procedure, or
If you find the witness was uncertain when identifying the defendant at the
lineup, photo-spread or show-up,
Then you should carefully consider whether this factor alone calls into question
the reliability of the witness's identification of the defendant at trial.
Composites
Composites generally bear very little resemblance to the actual perpetrator.
Thus, you should not place undue weight on the fact that defendant bears some
resemblance to the composite. In addition, asking an eyewitness to help put
together a composite can contaminate the eyewitness's memory for the
perpetrator and thus decrease an eyewitness's ability to identify the true
perpetrator in a subsequent lineup. In this way, composites can increase the risk
of mistaken identification.
Simultaneous Lineups
People naturally tend to select the person from a lineup who looks most like the
perpetrator relative to other members of the lineup, even when the perpetrator
is absent from the lineup. This is referred to as using a "relative judgment." The
danger of the relative judgment process is that even when the actual perpetrator
is not in the lineup, some member of the lineup will always look the most like
the perpetrator. People are most likely to use relative judgment when the police
use simultaneous lineups, where the witness is shown lineup members all at
once, as opposed to when the police use sequential lineups, where the witness
is shown lineup members one at a time. As a result, an innocent person is at
greater risk of being misidentified in a simultaneous lineup than in a sequential
lineup.
Showups
In this case, the defendant was identified at a showup procedure. Showup
identification procedures are where the police present the witness with only one
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choice, as opposed to lineups, where the police present the witness with several
choices. Showups produce a higher rate of mistaken identifications than lineups
when an innocent suspect resembles the actual perpetrator, but nonetheless may
be permissible when necessary and where a lineup is not feasible. You should
consider how soon after the incident the showup was conducted. The further in
time from the crime a showup is conducted, the greater the chance of a
mistaken identification compared to a lineup. In determining how much weight
to give such an identification, you should consider whether the show-up was
necessary, when it took place in relation to the crime, and you should further
consider all of the facts surrounding the show-up, including whether the suspect
was in hand-cuffs or otherwise restrained by the police, what was said to the
witness before, during, and after the showup, and whether the police warned
the witness that the person in the showup may not be the perpetrator, the
witness did not have to make an identification, and the investigation would
continue whether or not the witness made an identification.
No Pre-Trial Identification
Did the police fail to conduct a pre-trial identification procedure where such a
procedure could reasonably have been done? An identification at a fair pre-trial
identification procedure is generally more reliable than an identification of the
defendant in the courtroom. You should determine whether the State provided a
satisfactory reason why there was no lineup or photo-spread conducted prior to
trial.
In-Court Identification
Identifications made by witnesses at initial identification procedures are more
reliable than later identifications. For this reason, in-court identifications are
less reliable than previous identifications. In assessing the reliability of the
identification evidence in this case, you should assign more weight to the first
identification, if the procedure was fair, than to the in-court identification.
Opportunity to Observe
You must take into account whether the witness had an adequate opportunity
and ability to observe the perpetrator of the crime. You should consider
whether the witness had enough time to view the incident, whether the lighting
conditions were adequate, whether the witness was close enough to see the
perpetrator, whether the witness was able to pay attention to the perpetrator or
whether the witness was distracted, whether the witness was in the proper
condition to view the perpetrator, whether any obstacles impaired the witness's
observations, and whether anything occurred during the incident that may have
distracted the witness. You should also bear in mind that while witnesses' selfreports can be extremely reliable, they can also be unreliable, particularly if a
witness has been exposed to suggestive identification procedures or post-event
information.
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Regarding the witness's opportunity to observe, you should consider:
Durationof Incident
How much time did the witness have to view the perpetrator? You should
independently examine the event as described by the witness, along with any
estimate by the witness or others of how long it took. The shorter the amount of
time the witness had to view the perpetrator's face, the less reliable the
identification. Time estimates by a witness can be inaccurate, and witnesses
have a tendency to think events lasted longer than they actually did.
Distance
The greater the distance between an eyewitness and a perpetrator, the less
reliable the eyewitness's identification.
Disguise
If a perpetrator wears a disguise, covers his or her hairline with a hat, or
changes his or her glasses, hairstyle, or facial hair, there is an increased risk of
a mistaken identification. In this case, the perpetrator

_.

You should take this

into account when evaluating the reliability of the identification evidence in
this case.
Weapon Focus
You should consider whether a weapon was visible to the witness during the
incident. The presence of a weapon can distract the witness and take the
witness's attention away from the perpetrator's face. As a result, the presence
of a visible weapon reduces the reliability of a subsequent identification.
Whether the visibility of a weapon distracted the witness or made it harder for
him or her to identify the face or other distinguishing features of the perpetrator
is for you to decide.
Level of Stress
You should consider how stressful the event may have been to the witness.
Highly stressful events have a negative effect on memory and increase the risk
of a mistaken identification. Whether the event was stressful for the witness,
the level of the witness's stress, and whether the stressful nature of the event
distracted the witness or made it harder for him or her to identify the face or
other distinguishing features of the perpetrator, is for you to decide.
Witness's Condition
You should consider the witness's physical and emotional condition at the time
of the incident, as they may relate to witness's powers of observation. For
example, was the witness intoxicated during his or her observations? Does the
witness need prescription eyewear and, if so, was the witness wearing such
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eyewear during the incident? Whether the witness's condition made it harder
for him or her to identify the face or other distinguishing features of the
perpetrator, is for you to decide.
Cross-Race
When evaluating the reliability of the identification evidence in this case, you
should take this into account that the eyewitness and the perpetrator were of
different races. Eyewitnesses are less accurate at recognizing a perpetrator of a
different race than at recognizing a perpetrators of the same race. Even people
with no prejudice against other races and substantial contact with persons of
other races still experience difficulty in accurately identifying members of a
different race. Quite often people do not recognize this difficulty in themselves.
Whether the fact that the identifying witness is not of the same race as the
perpetrator and/or the defendant, and whether that fact might have had an
impact on the witness's original perception, and/or the accuracy of the
subsequent identification, is for you to decide.
In addition, you should consider:
Time Between the Incident and the Confrontation
How soon after the crime or event did the identification take place? Memory
can be degraded or lost by the passage of time. Memory for an event can begin
to decrease significantly immediately after the event. As time goes by,
identifications become less reliable. The sooner after the incident the
identification procedure took place, the more reliable the memory of the
witness. Therefore, you should consider how much time passed between the
incident and the first identification procedure.
Discrepanciesbetween Identifications,If Any
Did the witness provide only a general description of the perpetrator? Was
there a variation between the description the witness provided and the
defendant's appearance? Witnesses should be asked by the police to provide as
much detail as possible in their descriptions of the perpetrator. The inability of
a witness to provide distinctive details of the perpetrator, where these details
might be expected (given the characteristics of the defendant) may call into
question the reliability of the witness's identification of the defendant at trial.
Child and Elderly Witnesses
Identifications made by children and the elderly are less reliable than
identifications made by adults. You should take this into account when
evaluating the reliability of the identification evidence in this case.
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Police Witnesses
Police officers are no better than other people at making accurate
identifications. You must determine the accuracy of police officials'
identifications in the same way and by the same standards as you would
determine the accuracy of any other witness. The identification testimony of a
police official is not entitled to special or exclusive weight merely because the
witness is a police official.
It is entirely up to you whether to accept or reject a witness' identification. The
factors I have discussed have been shown to be the best indicators of the
reliability or unreliability of eyewitness identification. In the end, you must
determine whether the identification testimony is reliable.
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